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RECENT nEVlU·OPMENTS IN DEVELOPMRNT STUDIES 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE i:1ESSAGE OF FUTURIBLES p 
SOCIAL ACCOUNTING AND SOCIAL INDICATORS 
I 
In the course of the years, those engaged upon development have 
shown a variety of preoccupations. Mostly? these referred to development 
as a process in need of understanding as much as to development as a sys-
tematic effort. Not so long ago, one kind of planning after another used 
to keep the minds busy. More recently, evaluation was topical. Currently, 
social indicators and such-like concerns have the limelight. A longer-
lived preoccupation behind some of these is the quest for measurability 
and measurement~ . 
In due course the historians of the "period of development II will 
deal with this curious sequence of diverse preoccupations. Ina preliminary 
attempt at explanation they may be tempted to assume that,development being 
recognizedly complex and problematic, those concerned ~dll single out one . 
or a few features or issues at a time. Facing a subject matter of this 
magnitude, people will chew off a bit here or there. No doubt this assump-
tion may lead to a valid explanation of the emergence, whether sequential 
or otherwise, of a number of preoccupations. Next to be explained, two 
questions would crop up, both relating to the fact that preoccupations shift 
in the course of time. One refers to the nature of each specific preoccu-
pation, the other to the circumstances triggering and conditioning the emerg-
ence of each. Together, the answers to these questions may clarify vhat is 
now bound to appear) to many, as a bizarre spectacle of "fads and foibles" 
(to borrowSorokin's ter~s) in development studies and development work~ 
This paper is meant to render some assistance to these future 
historians. It is primarily an exercise in stocktaking, with particular 
regard to three currently fashionable trends in development studies. But 
it will go beyond mere stocktaking in that it is meant to offer.some inter-
pretation or assessment of the significance of current trends, both as 
results of developments hitherto an~ as pOinters, in their turn, towards 
further developments. 
The argument tvill be built upon three successive theses. The 
first of these (Section II) is that what may appear as a random sequence 
of unrelated preoccupations' is in fact neither random nor unrelated. The 
second thesis (Section IV) is that the three currently. predominant trends 
(briefly presented in Section III) concur in significant respects and ~hat, 
in so doing, they mark a major shift in general.outlook both in development 
studies and, perhaps, more generally in the social sciences at large. For 
brevity's sake this shift will be referred to, below', as a move away from 
a predominantly economic towards a more ~roadly social perception. The 
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third thesis (Section V) is that measurement playsCi mosJ::_ !l.()t_able rule in 
this shift. As a potential link between the social sciences, it would seem 
to acquire a significance well beyond that which its persistently instrumental 
function would appear to warrant. 
The purpose of the three theses together is to raise the question 
whether the reading of current developments that they seem to suggest could 
be correct and, if so, to what extent. This question will be discussed 
briefly, with special reference to the discipline of sociology as an illus-
trative case. 
II. 
The first thesis was born out of a hunch. Systematic consideration 
of' futuribles, social indicators and social accounting leads to the impression 
that there is more in common between the three than meets the eye. This could 
barely be shrugged off as a mere coincidence. But what if it is no coincidence? 
The tentative answer is in the thesis - more correctly, hypothesis - which 
postulates that the several preoccupations that have'manifested themselves in 
the field of development studies are neither random nor indeed unrelated. 
Were the thesis to prove acceptable then the matter of their relatedness is 
bound to emerge as something deserving attention in its own right. 
To begin with, the assumption that these preoccupationssnould be 
random occurrences can be dismissed out of hand. The possible degre~,of 
randomness that could occur in the given case is a function of the ,4egree of 
(un)relatedness. In what is to follow~ it will be argued that the apparent 
unrelatedness is illusory. Anticipating the outcome of that argument~ the 
degree of rand'omness that can be admitted at this point is bound to be low, 
not high, as might appear at a first blush. There is, moreover, a further 
consideration that makes it appear even lower. It is reasonable to assume 
that some of not all of the shifts in preoccupations occur in consequence of 
feed-back emerging from development work detennined by preceding preOccupations. 
If so, they do not form a random sequence but a concatenation.' 
Thus, the argument proceeds immediately to the more basic postulate 
that these preoccupations are fundamentally related. What they,have in common 
is that they are instances, incidental manifestations, of manis basic effort 
to master his context through understanding. In the last resort, the concerns 
with specific kinds of planning, with goals or evaluation or indicators of 
development, are so many exercises in establishing a definitional basis ~or 
action. In this attempt, preceding moves usher in subsequent ones: the con- . 
catenation already suggested. 
The demonstration of this thesis will shape up as a systematic taxonomy. 
It will show the several preoccupations listed, along with certain others not 
yet mentioned, as instances or variants of the same basic definitional concern, 
distinguishable from one another according to certain criteria to be introduced 
for the purpose. Once presented, this taxonomy will offer occasion for a few 
remarks about how people's predilections may ~')ve from one or some of the items 
it contains to another or others. 
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The first need is for setting out "{'That exactly the proposed iitaxonomy 
of special,concerns with regard to developmene l shall refer to. Development 
being a recognizedly elusive concept, this is not the easiest of exercises: in-
deed it will cause the ar~ument to detour into deep ~vaters for a short while. 
However ~ there should be a pay-off in the form of clarifi,cation, not just about 
the taxonomy but about development proper. 
He start by looking beyond development to that of which it somehoH 
is an aspect or a particular case, namely reality as such. Thisapparently 
complicating" procedure is in fact adopted for purposes of expediency. It 
permits a more sweeping perspective. This i~ its turn provides the latitucle 
needed to envisage the desired taxonomy along with its underlying principles 
of systematization. In this perspective, the taxonomy appears asa systematic 
listing of instances (not necessarily all instances) of ,what it is now proposed 
to call the man-reality relationship. The term is unusual but simple enough 1 
to be readily understood, as a capsule presentation of basic human experience 
. The man~reality relationship is as fundamental as it is complex. This 
complexity will feature as a plurality of instances. It can be understood as 
the joint result of a number, of considerations that apply to the'relationship. 
Since taxonomy is complexity made transparent, the same conditions (hut again 
not necessarily all .of them) are likely to feature once more, as distinctive 
criteria underlying its systemadcs. 
Now consider three2 of these criteria for differentiating betto1een 
instances - or~ more correctly phrased~ for identifying various specific 
instances - of the man-reality relationship. 
(1) In qualifying the relationship as 3 relation between its two 
constituents, primacy may be postulated forman or it may not. If it is, the 
relationship may feature as a subject-object dichotomy, by virtue of which 
the natural stand for man would be to dominate reality. Classical Greek 
tragedy cal~s this hybris: but it is also the ,Promethean perception of man 
which is typical of modern and largely also contemporary Western thought. If 
it is not, tIle relationship may feature as interrelation and interdependence. 
Primitive ritual is in many cases exemplary for this variant~ but so is, in 
theological phrasing, the t'trust in God" (tawakkul) attitude of Muslims which 
is so often misrepresented as fatalism, and, a fortiori fatalism in the 
classical seriseof the word. Seeking illustrations in-:"t-lesternscholarship, 
one may refer to the nineteenth-century idea of )iknowledge is power", in at 
least some of the uses to which it was put, as typical of the former variant, 
and to current cybernetic ideas as typical of a tendency to. prefer the latter 
without entirely sacrificing the former. 
(2) The nature of the relationship, as experienced ~y man, may be , 
qualified either mainly as understanding or mainly as action ~ Plato's concern 
with The Good, as compared tv.ith that of the Peace Corps volunteer, will readily 
illustrate the contrast. But Marx's phili~s.ophy of revolution, as wed to the 
proletarians" act of revolt, raises questions about the degree" to which the 
two are ~eparate. The same can be said with regard to economic development 
planning • 
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(3) The nautre of the relationship, again as experiencec:l byman6, may 
be qualified in yet another way, acc.ordine t07the manner in which man will 
attempt, rationally, to come to terms with it. There are mainly two ways that 
deserve to be mentioned here, namely the pars pro ~ h.shion on the one hand 
and the piecemeal, enumerative fashion on the other. Both are essentially def-
initional procedures: the exclusive relia:lce on the operational pattern of reason 
make~ it so. The one~ whilst purporting to deal with the 't17hole, substit~tes a 
part, which t~en is implicitly assumed to stand for, if8eed to be virtually 
identical with, ·the whole, at least for given purposes • Thus, whilst partial, 
it is simple, being a one-act procedure. The other, in attempting to deal with 
the whole, is aimed at optimal coverage. In serial~ itemizing fashion it . 
will list components, aspects, features, or whatever means of itemization may 
be selected, to end up with a listing that v1i11 be acceptable as representing 
the comprehensive whole as a totality. To the former approach, the whole may 
fe~ture as the universe of physics, or the world of beauty, or, to take an 
example closer to the present subject, "development lr , To the latter, it will 
feature as the nations of the world, a box of tools, or, again with an example 
relevant to this paper I s topic, I'national accountingrt • 
. It is possible, once again, to quote examples f~at straddle the fence 
between the two types or represent combinations of both . Thus, models for 
economic development planning in which factors or indicators are employed. 
Thus again, in Parsonian sociology, the summary presentation of sociocultufRI 
reality as action which in its turn is broken dovm in itemizing fa8hion12 , 3. 
The proposed taxonomy uses primarily the distinction sub (1); but, as 
will be discussed later, one finds evidence, here and there, of·the other two 
distinctions. This appears to an extent in the way specific items listed will 
shape up; it is even more traceable in the way the attention 6f those concerned 
will move from one combination of items to another. 
In the attachedchart~ the primary distinction is betvreen the pars 
pro toto and the serial distinction. This makes for countervailance between 
the upper and lower halves, but not necessarily for close similarity. 
The upper half shows a sequence of steps in repeated pars pro ~ 
procedure. People will use one or more of these steps in or.der to identify 
the universe of their concern at a particular moment. For the identification 
of a given topic, the succession of steps is irrelevant: any of the pars pro 
toto definitions of reality shown has the same validity as a topic for human 
understanding and action. Regardless of the question at which step it features, 
any definition adopted is, ill principle, one out of many possible ones, but 
this is of no concern to the person who adopts it. 
After these general observations on the upper half of the chart, two 
rather more specific remarks are due. As regards the last step shown, it seems 
worth realizing that the preoccupation, in some circles, with matters like de-
velopment assistance or development planning equals, or comes close to being a 
case of, pars pro ~ concern. In the penultimate column, social development 
has been listed as a possible third variant. This could raise doubts, as the 
term is unclear and may well be typical of serial rather than of pars pro !2!£ 
concerns. This point will be discussed below. 
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The bottom half of the chart details the serial, itemizing approach. 
For present purposes it is shown not as relating to reality as such but rather 
as relating to' development as one of ~ts instancesl4 The various ,distinctive 
criteria used in the successive steps of refinement have been listed in the 
chart and need no further explanation. The resulting list shows a number of 
topics of immediate importance to, the current scene of development studies and 
action. In a few cases, secondary distinctions have been added; these in their 
turn are self-explanatory. 
The lower half of the chart brings together a considerable number of 
concerns generally recognized as specifically developmental, along with others 
that are broader. This is appropriate: the two are equally valid elements of 
the list~ given the manner in which it is construed. 
Now that the chart has been presented, it seems warranted to state 
that the relatedness of all these cnncerns, which was postulated in the preced-
ing, is firmly established. They are all variants, in'one way or another, of 
one basic underlying concern. And there is more to be, said in respect of both 
the upper and the IO~'i'er half of the chart. The items listed are n~S merely 
related more or less distantly. They are never mutually exclusive • Practice 
proves this. In dealings with development. people will usually rely on a comb-
ination of elements taken from the listings provided in the chart. Practice also 
, shpws that the combinations used will vary in the course of time., Indeed this 
paper is given up to a discussion of such shifts. 
III. 
For the rest of this paper, the taxonomy will provide the basis for a 
presentation and discussion of current change - not to say reorientation - in 
development studies. 
It appears,that there are mainly two such changes. One is a shift in 
accent, from economic to social, in many discussions of development in general. 
The other is the already noted upsurge of some fairly specific interests amongst 
development experts and students of development. Whilst theoretical and even 
academic toa degree, these are manifestly action-oriented and'ftiture-oriented. 
By way of illustration~ mention may be made of interests like'futuribles, social 
accounting and as quoted above~ social indicators. In presenting and discussing 
these changes', it is proposed to take the latter first and the former afterygrds. 
This will facilitate the attempt to provide an interpretation or evaluation • 
Theinte:t:eJ~t in the future .took a new form l<1hen Bertrand de Jouvenel 
started what first looked like a new fad but is by now a respectable work-
ing procedure:' futuribles, the study of possible future deveiopmentsl7 • 
His thinking about the future differs from the thinking of most people in that 
he has made a point of reversing the accent on the two components of any kind 
of expectations, wishful thinking or utopianism on the one hand and level-headed 
extrapolation from the present on the other hand. In$tead of the former, he 
systematically stresses the lat~er. The attempt is to take the guesswork out of 
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envisaging the future; prognostication is intended to becom3 a controllable 
exercise, even when it expands beyond simple statistical extrapolation. It is 
perhaps not \v:·.thout significance that the standard prOC(.dul·e thus far is basic-
ally anecdot:::.l: publications tend to shape up as incidental reports on selected 
topics. The current acceptability of the procedure is apparent in the enthus-
iastic adoption and elaborat!on of the French initiative by Americans, indiv-
idually and in \·'think trml~s ;:.L8. 
Two things are hard to ascertain. One is the impact of these groups 
and of their style of thinking and ~vorking on the actl1.al conduct of public 
affairs, and again on societ~l dev~lopments at large. Th~ other is whether 
the futuribles approach results in an identifiel! 1e cun,'.llativc effect, a recog-
nizable thrust; the alternative being, of coursc, that it would remain eclectic 
and incidental. The beginnings of an answer to the seconr.! question could per-
haps be gleaned from a systematic content analysis of both the French and the 
American publications thus far.. 
There is· reason to believe that futuribles is a purposive attempt .to 
deal with the future on a broader front than is customarily done in economic 
planning19 • If anything, the approach is in terms of public affairs. Besides, 
it is geared to what appears ;-robable rather than what is considered desirable, 
as in planning. But these cons:f.derable differences betl\reen the tt-TO are blurred 
by what they share in common, namely the present as the only available frame 
of reference for cre~tive thinking: present condition3, present knowledge and 
techniques, the present perception of reality. 
There exists another convergence of minds upon an e~;:ercise that in 
attempting to pave the way towards the (invariably better) future, is mostly 
concerned ~lith the char.ging present. It has various nan:es, amongst them social 
accounting. Bertran Gross, a leading protago~ist, has stated that it is meant 
"as an instrument of prediction and control,,2v. There is a. manifest concern 
with efficacy. Social accounting experts tend to see th.:!m3clves as tLe mentors 
of the policy makers; or at least some of them do. There are others who at 
first sight appear less involved ,,71th policy-rtaking and development action. 
More academic in their immediate goals, they are mainly concerned with compar-
ing nation-state?21. That me-kes their work, in certain ways, a potential 
alternative to the comparison of cultures \vhich, in the han1s of anthropol •. tgists, 
has yielded few results that could be put to~~ractical use for purposes of man-
aging the newly emerged One v:orld of nations~·~. 83en in another perspective, 
it is an attempt :to do better than the economisto in a flctd that 'I11aS once called 
the wealth of.nations and that is currently called, instead, the widening gap 
between rich and poor nations <. In other words, there are ulterior motives, at 
least as ambitious as those of the social accounting experts who ·propose to 
guide the national planners. 
Again we ask what is the thrust of social ac(ounting? At a first 
glance the cumulative effect is impressive. Announced as systeos thinking, it 
appears as a readily available, fully serviceable instrumen.t for policy making 
and policy execution. Upon closer inspection, systems thinking turns out to 
embrace a broad ranEe of quite varied exercises in the enumeration of system 
elements. Rather than one comprehensive and firm grip on the totality that is 
to change or to develop, sod.al systems accounting amou~.ts to the very itemization 
that the word accounting connotes23 . In other words, the produ'.:!t is perhaps 
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somewhat different than the label suggests. This does not make it a bad 
product. -How-go-o<i---or-bad--it-wU-lbe -depends on other factors. The first of 
these is the inner systematics that would underly the enumeration, so as to 
warrant its consistency and indeed its substance, - in other words, to vin- . 
dicate the systems claim •. Over and beyond this, it resi,Ies in the possibility 
it offers to proceed from conceptual schemes speculatingly produced .towards 
effective action. Those in support of social accounting, and others as tyell, 
hold that a bridge between the two is available, in the form of measurement. 
If they are right,. the efficacy with which the social accounting expert will 
direct the development planner will depend on the results achieved in measur-
lng24. .. .. . . 
Again, it is hard to assess the impact that this kind of thinking 
exerts. No doubt these ideas are heard in academic circles. But they may 
prove to be ata handicap in the arena of political decision making. As a 
tool, social accounting seems somewhat formidable and unwieldy. On the 
other hand, it is not hard to envisage an influential role by the back door. 
There exists an affinity between this style of thinking and some of the more 
sophisticated administrative procedures. 
There' is 'considerable overlap between the advocates of social 
accounting and the third group in this review, the protagonists of social 
indicators25 • There is also considerable similarity in orientation and 
intentions. But there are differences that warrant keeping them separate 
for the purposes of this review. 
A first point of difference is that the concern with indicators 
is in certain respects somewhat more restricted than that with ~ocial 
accounting •. A set of indicators functions as a barometer, which is not 
quite the same as anl!instrument of prediction and control li • 
Ase~ond. point of difference is in the degree of reliance on the 
viewpoint and pro~edures of economics. Social accounting is an expansion of 
national accounting, a procedure of economics26 , into the extra-economic realm. 
The attempt:. is to broaderi the scope of economic planning so as to safeguard it 
from running into unforeseen obstacles. The economically determined pars 
pro toto of reality is not merely left intact: it is given a new lease of 
life. In their turn, the advocates of social indicators will likewise expand 
techniques of economics into the extra-economic realm. Their stated attempt is 
to tackle more aspects of reality than the economic one; but they avoid an ex-
clusively economic approach. The preference for terms like "social" and "levels 
of living'; makes this clear. It does not make clear ~hat alternative perception, 
if any, will henceforth be adhered to for purposes of coming to terms with the 
fullness of reality. There is no advance committment, whether to the economic, 
traditional viewpoint or to a new, alternative one, except for the manifest 
shift from a pars pro toto to a more inclusive, enumerative procedure. 
These are the differences; it is clear that they ~l1ill become obscured 
when social indicators are integrated as elements in~social accounting procedure. 
Using the same questions as asked previously, we may now inquire into 
cumulative effect or thrust, and into impact. 
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As regards the former~ in this case as in the tHO earlier ones we 
are dealing ,.;rith a basically enumerative procedure: the attempt is to grasp 
as much as possible of reality by enurherating as many as possible of its 
significant elements or aspects. Indeed the point in the exercise is to 
expand the list of items. Recently some concern has arisen about the innar 
systematics of such listings~ and thus indirectly about cumulative effect or 
thrust. For the time bing this concern shapes up, curiously~ in the statis-
ticians' manner: the search is on for correlations between items provisionally 
listed,and the ~~cliIlatioIl s.eems to be to discard items that do not fit the 
emerging pattern • It is to be foreseen that the effect of this new concern 
'with consistency will. limit the number of acceptab1.e items~ it is too early 
to determine whether this in its turn liTill limit the scope 8. ' .. 
For impact, some of those working on indicators are quire favourably 
placed, namely in the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) at Geneva. v1hether this 'vill~ in the long run~ prove an asset or a 
liability remains to be seen. In academic circles the subject attracts at 
least as much attention as social accounting; sometimes the t~vo are hardly 
distinguishable. 
IV. 
These, then, are some of the salient features of the currently 
fashionable cluster of preoccupations in development Hork. The next step in 
the argument will be to assess their significance as emergent concerns. It 
is in this context that the other major issue raised above vnll be taken up 
for consideration~ namely the shift from a mainly economic to a mainly social 
definition of ,development. 
Two observations must be interjected at this point to preface the 
discussion that is now in order and again to prevent misunderstandings. 
First, it should be pointed out in so many "lords that the current 
shift from a primarily economic to a primarily social perception of develop-
ment has been initiated by economists from a relatively early moment in 
development studies. Names like W. ~L Rostow, G. Myrdal, E. E. Hagen, 
J. Drewnowski will be remembered in this connection. It will also be remem-
bered that the initiative for the establishment of the United Nations Re-
search Institute for Social Development, just mentioned, was taken by econ-
ometrician J. Tinbergen. At no time that the present writer can recall29 
have members of 'other disciplines effectively challenged the primacy of econ-
omics in so many lvords. Such doubts as were voiced usually took the form of 
pleas in favour of multidisciplinarity. If at this time this primacy stands 
challenged anyway? the credit for having mustered the courage to do so goes 
mainly to those economists who felt that 'economic development planning, 
although manifestly beneficial, has not really come up to their eJ{pectations. 
Part of the phenomenon, no doubt, is to the credit of nobody in particular 
as it simply reflects experience gained in development work done, over e 
number of years', under economic guidance. Credits apart nO'(7, the real question 
is what this l'7idening of the scope means: for economics, for the other social 
sciences, for development work. At the appropriate point, the argument will 
have to return to this question. 
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The second remark is entirely different. The reader will have 
noticed that the publications that hnve appeared on the topics briefly 
reviewed-do not exclusively refer to the so-called developing countries. 
Many of them, not to say the majority~ refer to so-called developed coun-
tries. This is only correct: development is not the monopoly of under-
developed areas. But there is a lesson in it; too. 
At one time, the standard ideas and techniques prevailing in the 
developed countries were "exported" through experts and by training pro-
vided to students from developing countries, for use on problems of under-
development in the I1third world it • (The term"seems curiously obsolet~.) 
But the problems encountered were such that gradually alternative procedures, 
and to an extent theories, have been developed - largely by people from 
the developed countries who realized that their tools did not fit the job, 
LB.~pecific use in development situations. For a while, it could look 
as if a bifurcation of efforts and interests was about to take place. Even 
now, anxieties about such problc:11.e as the widening gap l..rill occa'sionally 
cause some people, especially in developing countries, to think'along such 
lines. 
However" n countervailing tendency appeared soon, in the form of an 
almost unbelievable proliferation of interest in development problems among 
social scientists. A peak '\iI'as reached at the 1962 vJorld Congress of Sociology, 
where an innocent onlooker might have been tempted to believe he was seeing 
three thousand development experts in action30 • Since then, much of this 
impetus has moved into other channels, but not without a new confluence ' 
taking place. 
It now appears as if some of the experience gained in developing 
countries is being put to use vrlth respect to some of the problems - not 
necessarily identified as development~l - in developed countries. Some of 
the expertise that iV'as first fairly naively exported is returning after 'a 
thorough shake-up of testing and revision. Probably this lqill be to the 
benefit of the developed countr.ies. It is also to be hoped that this cir-
cular movement of ideas~ having touched the developing countries,will remain 
effective there as well",l as a catalyzer for ideas 'V~hich, in becoming more 
and more congenial to the setting into which they have been introduced, should 
become increasingly usable. 
Resuming the thread, it will now be argued that the three emergent 
interests presented in the previous section rele,te to the shift from a pre-
dOminantly economic to a predominantly social definition of development in 
a manner that deserves full attention. This is the second thesis of this 
paper. Beside's being valid and useful concerns, the interests reviewed are 
syu~tomatic, in their emergence, of something much larger and much more sig-
nificant. This "something" appears, to an extent, in the reorientation from 
economic to social. As will be suggested in due course, there i,s more to it. 
But first, consider what has happened to economic development. 
Economic development, as a school of tho~ght and action, is ba'sed 
on a perception of (sociocultural) reality according to which you see and 
control all of a given state or society'if you see or control its economics. 
This vision harks back to the days when economics was the one social science; 
) 
I 
\ 
\ 
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it has never quite stopped fascinating the minds. We know that at a certain 
time and place this vision \<;ras reasonably well matched ~o]ith the a.ctual oper-
ational pattern of society. He also "now, but are slow to rec0cinize to the 
full extent, that in the ~-Jest, where it obtained once. the match is not as 
snug as it used to be and that elsewhere in the world~ the assumption of a 
match between the pr~l}jailing operational pattern and the economist: s image 
is hard to vindicate ~. 
In order to cope with this difficulty, some have explicitly introduced 
the consideration of so-called extra-economic facts and factors for 3~eir own 
sake rather than as additional matters that could be implied tacitly . In 
order not to upset the basic perception, how'ever, they were compel~ed to des-
cribe them as prerequisites for economic development. Hhen this caused doubts 
in its turn, some began to speak of obstacles to development. But the intent 
vlas, all the time~ to see that the prerequisites should be met and the obstacles 
removed. In other words, the end would bring the vindication of economic devel-
opment as the decisive moment or element of development. Others again have 
been liberal eiiough to postulate that any other development goals could be 
realized once economic development would be a given fact. This, surely, is 
yet another way to maintain the pivotal significance of economic development. 
As the matter stands, there is considerable willingness, amongst economists, 
to concede' the importance of what they like to call extra-economic consIderations, 
but rather less readiness to dravT the fundamental consequences. These, no doubt, 
relate to the validity of a viev~oint that hinges on the primacy of economic 
phenomena: a vielo7point that, as some economists do not tire to remind their 
colleagues and others, is fu~~y date et situe~ conditioned by the circumstances 
of n specific time and place . 
Amidst the confusion of economists pulling av7ay from the strictly 
economic approach and economists yet nmintaining, by any other' names, the prim-
acy of economics as a viewpoint, there exists a recognizable and to all srpear-
ances irreversible tendency a-tvay from the ';economocratic li orientation. The 
search is on ~Qr a new image; provisionally indicated by the fairly meaningless 
term "social il J. Whatever the outcome of this search, it is bound to be a 
major factor in determining a ne"!;'1 role for economics and for the econcmist~ in 
the social sciences as well as in public affairs. One attractive aspect of this 
change may well be that it could render unnecessary some of the claims, made 
on behalf of economics, tl.at at:pear not effectively tenable under conditions 
other th~m those under which they arose. 
This ,trend away from the ;'economocratic ll orientation is signalled 
by the three emergent interests that have been reviewed in Section III. As 
stated, some economists have played a key role in getting this'trend under way. 
At this point it is only fair to recognize, on the other hand, that scholars 
of other disciplines contributed their share in pushing it along. 
This is not a fortuitous occurrence. The matter is not a matter of 
economics only, neither in its upsurge nor in its prospects. In retrospect, 
it has never been. But it has taken some rather peculiar circumstances to bring 
the point home to those concerned. Whatis'peculiar about the circumstances is 
that there is in fact not one shift - aw'ayfrom the primacy of ecollomics - but 
a combination of three. The newly emerging concerns reviewed above signal all 
three of them; Since they obviously will signal compound effect rather than 
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separate inputs, the necessity at this point is to distinguish them from one 
anQther. The easiest way to do so is to offer a brief listing. 
First, there is a shift in definitional procedure, from the pars pro 
toto definition in one act~ towards serial definition through itemization. 
The presentation offered in Section II has another use in addition.to taxonomy 
proper. It provides the map on v7hich it is possible to identify a trend. The 
trend leads away from the upper to the lower half of the chart; more specific-
ally from economic development as one ~6 the items on the upper half to some 
combination of items on the 10t07er half • As yet, no stable combination has 
appear,ed: people are .groping their way. 
Secondly, there is the shift, just discussed, from a perception in 
terms of a primacy of economics to an alternative perception, whether in terms 
of an alternative primacy or in terms of a refusal to accord primacy. 
The third shift runs from one appreciation of man's place and role in 
the world to another. According to the one, man is dominant and the world is 
amenable to his action; according to the other, man interacts with the world 
of which he isa part. 
It should be possible to show that these shifts have nothing to do 
with one another} but to do that would be a wasted effort. What matters is 
that the three happen simultaneously. The impact of this coincidence is not 
to be underrated. Take the second shift. In principle the option between some 
alternative primacy or no primacy se~ms open; but not so in practice. The . 
coincidence of the first and the second shifts listed will in all probability 
cause the second to skip tr.e moment of choice and to head straight for the no-
primacy option. For a long time, there have been many waiting in the wings, 
hoping to find a receptive audience for their thesis that development is a total 
phenomenon. affecting literally every aspect or segment of the human collect-
ivity concerned. In similar fashion, the third shift is bound to prove a strong 
force making .the other two happen much faster than they might otherldse. 
As suggested, the upsurge of futuribles, social accounting and social 
indicators is clearly a matter of the joint effect of the three t~ndencies 
now distinguished. The three are alike in that they represent an attempt to 
liberate the mind from what is increasingly experienced as the constraints of 
the economic ~pproach, and to reach out fqr the full~ess of reality. They 
are again alike. in that, being thus totalistiS7 they adopt the same enumerative 
procedure at the expense of the pars ~ toto • TheBe things are clearly 
visible. Less clearly visible, they are again alike in that they imply. rather 
than postulate. the third tendency. Without its impact, they are inconceivable; 
but not all the writings in these fields bring this out. 
This being so, a few more remarks on the third trend are in order, 
more so sinc~ the other two have been detailed above. In this case as in the 
other two, the trend is not specitic to development: it features on a broader 
front, ·so to speak. The broader relevance is, in fact, more in evidence in 
the developed than in the developing countries. Accordingly, the presentation 
will begin in rather general terms, such as are usually applied when Hestern 
writers refer to Western conditions. That done, the development perspective 
will be introduced more or less as an application or a particular variant. 
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A fundamental reorientation is gradually taking place as, regards 
man's role in respect of the reality that surrounds him. Reality is less and 
less conceived,i~ what used for a lont; time to be the standard manner, namely 
in terms of a subject-'object:division, supposed to function by way of human 
control over man's context, both human and non-human, which in its turn was 
supposed to be fully amenable to such control. Nmvadays, one can hear this 
operational model decried as repression; a sure sign that its credibility is 
waning and that by consequence its usefulness is bound to wither away. A 
likely candidate to take its place is an intersubjectivity model of cybernetic 
inspiration, with steering and feed-back as its salient features. The hard-
and-fast model' for unconditional effectuation is giving lilay to a virtually 
experimental model of creative impulses. Likewise $ the hierarchical connot-
ations of the subject-object divij~on are making room for virtua11yegalit-
arian intercomm~nication patterns . Giving credit where credit is due, it 
must be said that the experience g3~ned with economic planning has contributed 
considerably to this reorientation • " 
\-Jith specific reference to development, this tendency leads away from 
a categorical and prescriptive approach towards an alternative that, in being 
necessarily more sophisticated, is likely to prove some1:vhat elusive for the 
time being. The speed 1:vi th which these changes occur is truly amazing., In less 
than twenty years, we have built something like a budding routine or pattern 
for development work. It is far from finished and it has not yet had the time 
to harden into, any thing like a definitive shape. So much is clear, though, 
that it is b~S,ed on fairly categorical notions both as regards development and 
as regards society as the unit or frame of development. But already, the very 
categorical nature of these notions, and consequently the chief characteristics 
of the procedure that they seem to imply. are coming under cri,tical reconsider-
ation. 
Instead of dealing, categorically, with society or the nation-state 
as the unit that is developing or to be developed, the development worker or 
agency turns out to be dealing .iTith one very specific instance ,qf the species 
"development situations',l. Likewise~ it transpires that development lvork at 
any time is but one specific instance, one highly specific configuration, of 
needs, tendencies, possibilities and efforts: not repeatable - not even with a 
mutatis mutandis clause - from one case to the next. A vague and elusive pros-
pect? Yes, for him who is out for the readily applicable standard formula. 'No, 
,for anyone realistic enough to see that the solutions for difficult matters 
cannot be easy. 
It is interesting to compare, point for point, the direction in which 
development w'ork seemed to be going until a few years ago with the direction 
that it appears to be taking at this time. Of course, such an exercise in con-
trast does no justice to the quite gradua,l nature of the transition as it isa 
actually occurring. But then, its purpose is clarification of issues involved. 
The left column offers an overly schematic presentation of some of the salient 
features of de~Olopment theory and practice as they appeared to crysta1ize some 
five years ago. The right column, equ~llyschematic, suggests, pcint for 
point, the alternative trend that appears to be in the cards at the time of 
this writing. 
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1. Development is a matter of the 1. 
present period and one that has 
come to attention 'fairly recently. 
2. It occurs,both as a problem 2. 
and as an effort, in particular 
parts 'of the world. somehow in 
connection with the achievement of 
political independence. 
3. It is a matter involving a rel- 3. 
atively short span of time; it 
should somehow be achieved in the 
near future, and those involved 
are handicapped by a lack of time. 
4. It involves relatively -- indeed, 4. 
optimally - large human collectiv-
ities, usually organized as sover-
eign nation-states. 
5. Its manifestation refers to the 5. 
6. 
7. 
material well-being of the members 
of these units~ and by implication 
to the technological and organiz-
ational state of affairs: the point 
being that all these feature as 
being in need of improvement or 
remedy.. 
By t<I-ay of a mora remote perspective,6. 
it also involves their entire way of 
life and the full range of cond-
itions underlvhich they exist. 
Itconriotes, furthermore~, that with- 7. 
in a given developing unit - whether 
state 7 economy or society - there 
will exist a distinct agent of devel-
opment (not seldom the government and 
its agencies), which will act in res-
pect of the people at large in sucH a 
manner as to effectuate development. 
Development is the'current label 
for situations where a systematic 
and more or less institutional 
effort is made to steer sociocultural 
(including economic~ political, etc.) 
changes. 
It can occur anywhere in the world, 
under various names. Its occurrence 
in the so-called third world does 
not constitute more than one, crudely 
defined, class of variants of the 
phenomenon as such. 
It relates to the future so far as 
foreseeable with existing means, with-
out ignoring the general prospects of 
the more remote future; more import-
antly, it is a matter of relentless 
action in the ongoing present to which 
the past, particularly the recent past, 
contributes by way of feed-back. 
It may relate to human collectivitips 
of various sizes and aspects; thus 
diversified as to unit of reference, it 
is equally variable as to range and 
type of purposes served. 
It reflec ts the alvareness ~ of those 
actively involved, that change and 
development relate in principle to the 
total human condition and that conse~ 
quently whenever one or a few salient 
issues are accorded special attention 
or treatment,' their relationship to 
everything else must be accounted for. 
The general urge is meliorative, and 
this with regard t~lall aspects of 
sociocultural life : 
Part of the institutionalization 
ment;ioned above - sub I - implies that 
certain people or agencies will fulfill 
special development roles and functions. 
Both the roles and the actors are var-
iable: several different ones may occur 
at one time and place, and they may 
change or be replaced in the course of 
time. 
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8. This agent, in its turn. is 
assumed to operate in accordance 
wi th some existing model or para--
digm, reasonably adjusted to. the 
peculiarit:ies of the situation 
he faces. 
B. These roles and functions are basic-
ally a matter of interaction of those 
concerned with all others· making up 
the development situation concerned, 
resulting in optimally.j6int efforts 
to identify, determine and implement 
relevant goals. 
9. This model is, furthermore. assumed 9. 
to be at its disposal. l-lhether as 
ready knmv-how or in the form of 
expert advice available from outside, 
By implication, this model for improve-
ment of conditions is fully specific 
to these conditions themselves, even 
if it may contain. ingredients derived 
from other contexts. What is more, 
it is an emergent model. 
. This, in brief, is what appears now as the immediate prospect for de-
velopment action. It seems beyond doubt that futurib1es, social accounting and 
social indicators,if put to use in this kind of fram~:t0rl;:: as ilinformation for 
development ll ) should achieve their optimal usefulness .. 
v. 
But what about development studies? The central question of this paper 
is what these ne.iT developments in the field of development \qillmean for the 
study of development as conducted in several of the social sciences. flore spec-
ifically, the question is.whether anything can be said, in the light of these 
new trends and fashions, that might either dismiss or substantiate and spell out 
the claim, too often and too easily repeated by many, that development studies 
must be mu]t:.i:lisciplinary or, better still. interdisciplinary.·· 
The trouble about· the interdisciplinarity thesis is that it is so 
irrefutable. It was irrefutable before development studies emerged, it has 
become more irrefutable since. In development studies, it ~-7as irrefutable before 
these ne,v orientations came up; it is more irrefutable since they did. The in·· 
creased totalistic sensitization amongst scholars can but translate itself into 
a renewed assurance that you need the full range of intel1ectural di.sciplines, 
complete with these respective tools, fully concerted. if you are ever to measure 
up against the sheer bulk of that whi.ch you have chosen to confront. But beyond. 
this ~ , .. ha t? 
Attempts have been made, in.1ine with the expansiveness that some 
attribute to ec·onomics as a discipline. to recruit other social sciences, notably 
sociology, into .its service, so as to clear away any "adverse effects tl of extra-
economic factors~ Given the circumstance that these liadverse effects" \vere de-
fined in advance and strictly in terms of economics, arrangements like these did 
not have a reasonable chance to succeed> on the \vho1e, they ,vere short-lived and 
seldom reported. 
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In retrospect, one can only say that there was no ground for such 
attempts in th~f"irst place. In order. to start them itt'i6uld have t:obe assumed 
that between the several social sciences II degree of affinity or parallelism 
exists, to serve as a common ground. This assumption, .as is generally known 
though rarely recognized. exists only in hypothetical fashion •. Indeed it is not 
as if each of the social sciences perceives. and then deals with, its particular 
part or aspect of sociocultural reality (whether in pars pro ~ or in segmentary 
fashion, is ~~et another matter) in such a ~vay that together they deal with all of 
it. That would be so if the parts or aspects concerned would all be determined 
in basically the same manner,so as to form a set of one kind. But it is one 
of the basic facts of the historical growth c=;f the social sciences that in 
emerging and growing, each has at its own time and in its Otvn manner (whether 
regardless of the others or in incidental contradiction to some of them) identif-
ied (that is, selec~3d and defined) a morsel of sociocultural reality to be, 
henceforth, its o~m • Noreover. what ap~!ies to disciplines applies, unabated, 
for schools of thought within disciplines • In short. the idea to co~ordinate 
all the social sciences around one of them is a kind of uninformed tvishful think-
ing. Most of those who have dreamed about it, one time or another~ have meanwhile 
awakened, - some, it is to be feared, with a start. 
Co-ordination of the social sciences with none of them in a central, 
co-ordinating position is, for the very same reasons, even more of an illusion. 
So long as multidisciplinarity or interdisciplinarity is to be seen as a matter 
of co-ordination, the condition arises that a basic parallelism must be avail-
able to begin with. Such parallelism could come sbout only as the fruit of much 
painful reconsideration and redefinition in the bosoW50f each of the social 
sciences, with due regard for what goes ron in others . In other words, co-
ordination is needed in order that co-ordination may come into existence. Try to 
enVisage this in a perspective of academic freedom, and the .conclusion is clear. 
On this score, the present writer has at .one time been dreaming some dreams, he 
has awakened in his turn, perhaps wiser, certainly sadder. 
It is against this backdrop that the emergent interests in futuribles, 
social accounting and social indicators acquire special significance. It is 
possible to detect an implicit claim in the three, to the effect that we may yet 
get out of hiuill'S way and succeed in doing the trick; - and a trj.ck it will be. 
The claim has, to this write.rls knowledge, not been made fully explicit; none-
theless it comes through loud and clear, and little reading bet~veen the lines is 
needed to spell it out. lVhat it amounts to is that the problems reSUlting from 
the basic diversity of the social sciences can be avoided, ~nlilst gearing each 
and everyone to the same task, if the proper measures are taken. 
These measures~ in their turn~ amount to an exercise - as it happens, 
a remarkably simple one basically in reduction. In lieu of relying on each 
discipline, .lock, stock and barrel, it is proposed to rely merely on such meas-
uring procedures as it has made and tvill be making available.· A clear case of 
substitution,and in mHny \Vays the basic act of substitution that precedes, and 
perhaps warrants, an unlimited sequence of acts of further substitution; sub-
stitution being a central feature of the three schools of thought under review. 
argued. 
segment 
It is fairly easy to see how this basic act of substitution could be 
Once having taken out of each discipline that operational aspect or 
which all disciplines share in co~non, one can afford to disregard the 
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totally different backgrounds against ~vhich this aspect features in each dis-
cipline separately and by which it is,a.nd remains, fundamentally determineu. 
The practical implications of this reasoning tend to make it very 
attractive. Hhat it really says is that you can Ilgetrennt marschieren, vereint 
schlagen": make a hit jointly after having moved separately. Nor are preced-
ents lacking, They seem abundant in science, at all levels of .research. One 
example that must have had a particularly great significance for those promoting 
these ne~~ i"f}15eres ts. occurs on the border between science and social sciences: 
cybernet1cs • . 
. . 
The ultimate implication is that if the message of futuribles, social 
accounting and social indicators is correct, everything wil11 henceforth, depend 
on measurement. Measurement, with substitution as its necessary corollary, is 
not just instrumental; indeed it is central and crucial, not to say fundamental. 
All stakes are on one card. The card, as it happens, has been drawn out of the 
semidarkr.E:ss of secondary concerns into the limelight of prime interest. This, 
one assumes, is why' the prima facie revie~v of the three in Section III, did not 
immedia tely reveal it. --- ---
The first thesis of this paper (eGe, Section~I) said that the three 
tendencies reviewed are related, together and also with other approaches to 
development. The s~cond (Section IV) said that they are symptioms of a fund-
amental and far-reaching reorientation. that affects much more than development 
alone. At this point, the )::hird and final thesis appears. It says that, as 
developments in their own right, they represent yet another reorientation, this 
one relating to' the style of pursuiing the social sciences, both severally and· 
- main innovation - jOintly. 
As a result of this reorientation, the relative significances of 
concepts and theory on the one hand and methods and techniques on the other are 
about to be reversed. If these neT,v 1:endencies have their way> the accent will 
henceforth be on the latter .and not, as has been the case customa:rily, on the 
former. At the.same times methods and techniques 'viII be redefined to an ex-
tent, so as to accord primacy to measurement, in the broadest sense, including 
quantification, substitution and comparison. 
If this reading is correct, two standard questions .are in order. Is 
it acceptable? Where will it lead? It would not be unreasonable to decline 
to answer them. It is too early to see where these things will lead and surely 
their acceptability is better assessed later, in the light of experience, than 
now, in an inevitable response to the occasionally high-pitched claims made on 
their behalf. Yet to desist from so much as an attempt at asses~ment equals 
letting the movement proceed without the benefit of critical reflection to 
which, after all,' its promotors are fully entitled. In short, some tentative 
remarks are due~ 
The answer to the quest~,on concerning acceptability involves at least 
two different considerations. One refers to the alleged scientific character 
of the approach, the other to the hotly debated issue of measurement as such. 
.! 
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47 The urge to be scientific is an inherent problem of the social sciences • 
It is_impossible and unnecessary here to try and "do justice to the full range 
of controversial issues. For present purposes the matter may be summed up, in 
capsule rendering, by stating that the approach would be scientific if only the 
subject matter were amenable. In·other words, the current position of the social 
scientist is such that he has a choice as to which horn of a dilemma ~B would 
rather be caught on: values on the one hand. measurement on the other • 
Tertium non datur. So long as this state ~f affairs will remain characteristic 
of the social sciences - and this includes all of the foreseeable future - the. 
same pair of questions is bound to be raised about every new venture~ how 
scientific is it?, and~ how scientific can we afford to be given the implic-
ations of what tie attempt to do for the humans. that is ourselves, to l-lhom it 
refers? 
In the preceding~ some observations have been offered. for example 
about the inclusion and exclusion of items to serve as indicators, that relate 
directly to this kind of questioning. There is no need to repeat or to list 
them at this point. 
The three developments reviewed aboye clearly represent yet another step 
in the ongoing effort to become more scientific. That, with due respect, is not 
what could be new in them. Nor is there much reason, at this stage, to expect 
that they should constitute the definitive break-through towards the achievement 
of the .lofty goal of scientificness. Their only claim in this connection is the 
postulate as to the primacy of measurement, about which more will be said presently. 
Even granting the newness of this claim, there is nothing that could be seen to 
represent an actual or potential modification, whether in basic outlook or even 
in procedure~ that might warrant the expectation that from now on the social 
sciences will be altogether different. 
In writing doW!) a judgment like thiS, one is subject to considerable 
trepidation. After all, the major breakthroughs do not really show their sig-
nificancewhen they occur: they dawn upon the minds slowly. and to a large 
extent only in retrospect. There is no reason really to exclude such a poss-
ibility now. On the other hand, this paper in offering an analysis, must perhaps 
imply a little prognostication, but certainly nothing more. Were. it to express 
hopes, as the promotors of these new approaches will naturally do, the position 
would be very different. The judgment just passed seems to represent the kind of 
prognosticative evaluation that is possible ll7ith the means nOt'1 available to this 
writer. 
Now that the moment has come to say something more on measurement, part 
of the remarks that should find a place here have been anticipated as the argu-
ment developed. The main point, it seems, repeats that which has just been·said 
with regard to the attempt at scientificness. According primacy to measurement 
does not really alter the basic fact that in the social sciences, measurement 
is one of the two horns of the fundamental dilemma facing the scholar. That, 
surely, is and remains far from making it an unequivocally attractive proposition. 
There. is no point here in rehashing all the debates that have been and 
can be conducted on the merits and drawbacks of measurement. Trying another cap-
sule presentation, it may perhaps be said that there is nothing to suggest that 
in the case of the social sciences measurement as a scientific procedure would 
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not be subject to the law of diminishing returns49 . Indeed if it were~ this 
might ~vell be consj.dered to be a symr~om of the differe'lce between science 
and social scien'.' es . 
At least two reanons can be quoted 'l>7hy this may be the case. One is 
that~ as some maintain,the statistical!runs in the social sciences are too 
short. They say it .is a difficulty characteristic for the social sciences that 
relative to an infinitely large. number of variables, as currently tdentified~ 
(i.e., perceived and defined). the statistical runs per variable are very shortSO • 
If and insofar as this is so~ even the most sophisiticated computer is to little ., 
avail: this would ,be a fundamental rather than a practical difficulty. 
The second is that measurement as a procedure is not neutral in respect 
of the qualitative aspects of phenomena measured. Before comparison of estab-
lished quclntities becomes a workable proposition, quantif.i,cntion must have been 
attended to. This is a matter of reduction. Phenomena as found in the raw are 
submitted to a t.reatnient that accords primacy to their quantitative over their 
qualitative aspects~ virtually to the point of eliminating things qualitative~ 
these are supposed to be subsumed under such quantitative features as are re-
tained for consid~ration. In many cases, this is not enough to yield the desLred 
manageability of phenomena. Then~ people will resort to a more forcible kind Of 
reduction~usually called substitution. If the phenomenon someone 'liTishes to qu:m-
tify resists quantification' for one reason or another, he will substitute another 
one, that can be accepted as a fair replacement for the given purpose. This re-
placement may mean various things. Occasionally, another phenomenon is selected, 
considered equally symptomatic for that in which the scholar is interested. Or 
it may be decided to concentrate on one aspect, factor or segment of the des::.red 
phenomenon, which :~appens to be quantifiable. and to use this as a substitute 
for the whole th~t is not. All these procedures are fully accepted by now; they 
provide the basis for the quantitative analysis and model building that are con-
sidered by maT'.y. to be the truly impor':ant side of the sccial sciences. Accord-
ingly, there is rather less readiness to realize that for the convenience of 
quantifying reduction and substitutton we are in fa.ct paying a price every time 
we reduce or substitute. 
It is hard to say what exactly this is going to mean in the end. The 
fact is that the loss incurred in reduction and substitution is in many cases 
hard~ if not impossible, to account for. Yet the solidity of any model,. theory. 
or indicator produced in this manner is bound to be ~~akened to a degree exactly 
proportional to this loss. It might therefore be worth attempting to assess it, 
or at least its order of magnitude (to use a quaatifying expression, for a change). 
In order to. prevent misunderstanding, let it be recognized .that losses 
are incurred any time the an:::.lyzing mind attempts to cO:'1.e to terms with instances 
of reality, regardless whether the procedure applied is quantification or some-
thing else. That is not the point at issue. Such concern as is. being expressed 
here relates to the quite specific state of affairs under revie117, where primacy 
is accorded to measurement. . 
Everything is staked on measurem·.:nt, for better or worse. This me~ms 
that the opportunities offered by measurement are significantly enlarged; it also 
means that its inherent problems are enlarged by e~~actly the same factor. In 
view of the current mood to laud the enhanced possibilities, it seems reasonable 
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to promote a more balanced appreciation. The only way to do this is by draw-
ing attention to some drawbacksensuiing fr01ll1,mreS9lved _issues. 
In an attempt to articulate this concern somewhat further still, the 
following remarks~ made with special regard to indicators~ may be helpful. 
It is conceivable that the relentless effort at expansion of the range and 
scope of indicators 'tV'ill, in the course of its progress> ru.n into increasing 
difficulties of reduction and substitution. In other words, as the search for· 
indicators moves fut:ther and further away from the realm of economics, it may 
face phenomena that could well prove increasingly resistant to quantification. 
To make it worse, it is also conceivable that these phenomena would turn out. 
to have proportio~ally more) and therefore more problematic, significance for 
the designing of effective development policies. 
At the time of this writing, those working on indicators can probably 
still afford to feel little concern about a possible future problem like the 
one here suggested. This, however, should not give them the conviction that 
their problem has been licked in principle. A sociologist would foresee trouble 
in regard to the de~per recesses of sotetal existence~ those things that unify 
and diversify, stabilize and destabilize. An anthropologist, in his turn. might 
worry about culture conditioning of human ideas and actions. 
So much for the first question, 'tV'hether these ne1i7 developments are 
acceptable. Obviously they are acceptable, coming from serious and highly 
qualified scholars. In addition, they are acceptable once again in the light 
of the critical appraisal attempted thus far. Such weaknesses as they appear 
to have are found in earlier schools of thought as well, and often in greater 
measure. 
This leads to the second question, where these new' developments may 
lead. Even more than the earlier one, this sounds like an impossible question 
to anSlV'er and therefore an unfair one to ask. There is occasion~ however, for 
tto10 brief remarks, the one on realism and the other on relevance. 
One of the common traits of futuribles, social accounting and social 
indicators is a renewed insistence on realism. This applies in two perspectives, 
namely that of the present state of affairs and that of the prospective state 
of affairs. In the case of futuribles the accent is on the latter~ in the other 
cases it is on the former; but the two perspectives, in complementarity to one 
another, can.be detected in all three. 
The insistence on more, and more effective, realism in respect of the 
future is not a new development in itself. It continues, perhaps gives a new 
lease of life to, something that has been a typical preoccupation of Western 
thought for some time now. It also marks a point of difference between current 
Western and certain kinds of traditional non-Western thinking. It is generally 
recognized by now that this difference entails a possibility of fairly serious 
misunderstandings as planning is introduced into developing countries. Given 
the difference between the practice of planning on the one hand and the prospect 
of reasonably indubitable prognostication on the other, it seems possible that 
new questions ~y arise, later rather than sooner, about old problems, such as 
determinism and the self-fulfilling prophecy. However, this is not likely to 
become urgent so long as the kind of prognostication done in the way of futuribles 
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has no better prospect than being put to use as one more ingredient in the 
production of plans. 
On the other kind of realism~ in respect of the present state of 
affairs, so much has been said above that next to nothing remains to be said 
here. As a reac tion to tha t ~'7hich precedes i t ~ it is a, normal occurrence and 
a sign of life. As a hoped-for corrective to that which precedes it~ it still 
has to prove its mettle . The decisive issue ~ in this respect ~ may lvell be '51 
whether or not the spell of economics will be broken and ~ if so ~ in v7hich manner • 
Relevance is the other consideration that comes to ,mind. ' In Hestern 
developed countries there is, these days ~ an outcry for relevance ~ 'Hhat it pur-
ports is not easy to ascertain. Societal concern is a major component but it is 
one out of sever.i:d. Something like psychological subjectivism is another one» 
and, bien ~tonn~s de se trouver ensemb1e~ anarchism is yet another one. Be this 
as it may, it appears that a case can be made for the validity of the demand for 
relevance~ once the effor't would have been made to spell out l-1hat, then~ should 
be relevant to ~vhat or whom. In the developing countries a. recognized problem 
of relevance occurs in that some of the prescriptions applied in combating under-
development and its symptoms prove less than reasonahly effective. In retrospect 
it often appears that their relevance had been insufficiently ascertained in the 
first place. 
In the preceding, it has been argued that futuribles, social accounting 
and social indicators are inconceivable unless as belonging in a broader frame-
work of thought· determined by the cybernetic conception of reality. If and in-
sofar as this asc~iption will stand, this should imply that they represent some-
thing like a new beginning.as regards relevance. They would diffe!-,from earlier 
.'l.pproaches to development in that to them relevance Hould be basic» indeed their 
true starting point. As an innovation,this is bound to elicit high hopes 
on the part of many people. On the other hand ~ there is no getting av7ay from the 
recognition that~ if all this is correct, it yet remains to take effect. The 
probable reason for this someHhat disconcerting state of affairs .is that those 
constituting the vanguard of these three new developments are primarily engaged 
in other directions. They are busy scanning the future, producing 'social accounts 
charts and establishing ever ne,·! sets of social indicators, and they are trying 
to convince the planners of the usefulness of all these new tools. , 
The final,:tvor.d in this section is a note of cautious optimism. Nobody 
has announced miracles and indeed are, not to be 
expected, for the simple reason that they never are. Improvement of current per-
formance in development work seems likely, on t~vo counts. The· transition, from 
the older to the newer ideas and procedures is sufficiently difficult to tvarrant 
the expectation tha,t sooner or later some obsolete conceptions and techniques 
may be discarded, in consequence of the spread of these neH developments. On 
the other hand, it is not so difficult that it could not he made. In other words, 
such nelt7 questions as are likely to be raised ~ and nevI attempts undE'.lrtaken~ can 
start on their proper course without running, from the outset, into too much 
adversity. 
22. 
VI. 
As suggested in the preceding section 7 one implication of the new 
developments is the attempt to bypass the j.nsuperable problems arising out of 
the fundamental diversity that characterizes the social sciences. The attempt, 
in other words, to meet the need for interdisciplinarity v1ithout really trying 
to solve the problem of interdisciplinarity. As stated, the means to this pur-
pose is reduction, namely to measurement as one element commonly shared by all. 
Hhat remains to be considered is the probable implications for each 
of the social'sciences separately. This exercise~ if undertaken here~ could 
easily expand this paper f;:tr beyond the limits of its theme, wide as they are. 
It would also be far beyond the limits of this irriter's competence. All that 
can be offered is a fet·J tentative remarks, and these restricted to sociolpBY. 
I It is not impossible that more or less analogous remarks could be made on some 
other discipline; but the temptation to do so will be resisted. 
The.starting point for these observations is the recognition that the 
act of according primacy to measurement reverses the customary distribution of 
accent, that is, of importance attributed to the several components of the business 
called sociology. The limelisht shifts. Nonetheles,s, the element that Hill 
henceforth be,in the shadow is not discarded: it remains a vital part of the 
discipline asa Hh~le. This has implications~ ~'7hich need no\" to be considered. 
It is hazardous to try and describe, let alone define the two faces of 
the coin that is thus being flipped over. Following Sorokin'sS2 lead, one may 
start out from the common distinction between theories on the one hand and methods 
and techniques on the other (ignoring, for the moment~ the ideologies that he 
presents as a third category). The decision to accord primacy to measurement 
could, then, be seen as a pars pro toto manner of ascribinr, prime importance to 
the methods and techni'1ues side of sociology. As it happens" this is in keeping 
't-lith a much more general trend in the discipline. The question that arises refers 
to the implications. 
The ans~"er has 0.70 elements. One, just mentioned ~ is that the face that 
happens to be in the, shado'i7 is as much a part of the coin as the face that receives 
the light. To stress the one to the pOint t-7here ~·ye would lose sight of the other 
is therefore a risky affair, more so as it seems impossible to account, let alone 
compensate ,. f·Qr the loss incurred in the process. The other part of the answer 
refers to the oft~n ignored fact that not just anything at the methods and tech-
niques and of 'sociology is a fair match to anything at the theory end. The matter 
of affinity needs to be considered. Thus~ opting for primacy to be accorded to 
measurement is'uot reallys or at least not effectively, opting out of the con-
sternations of theory. It implies a tacit and therefore virtually uncontrollable 
decision in favour of certain kinds of theory over other kinds. The .reason is 
that some are more supportive of measurement" than others and that measurement can 
in the last resort not do without at least some tacit and implicit bolstering by 
theory. The implication is not objectionable at all; but its tacit nature is. 
Any tacit decision or choice is an unSCientific act because it aUoids rendering 
account. 
The implicit preference for certain kindl? or styles of theorizing is con-
siderably reinforced in the present case, where the act to accord primacy to 
measurement is one out of a set of options made, which together constitute the 
signal features of these three schools of thought. The - again implicit - commit-
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ment to a cybernetic perception of reality is yet anothS3 force causing more 
affinity to certain styles of theorizing than to others • This can only mean 
that any success of futuribles, social accounting and social indicators in 
capturing the attention of sociologists 1;-1ill somehm-1 translate itseif in a 
buddine; or grov!ing preference for certain types of theory ~ that will directly ~ 
or , given the implicit nature of these goings-on, perhaps rather indirectly 
support measurement. 
At the j)resent time, a potential trend like this has a peculiar sig-
nificance. To demonstrate this it is necessary to deviate somev7hat from 
Sorokin's picture~ Having listed a number of types of sociological theory, he 
proceeds to state that the outside observer of so much diversity should none-
theless not succumb to the temptation to decide that the Hhole thinB is a shambles. 
Sociology is something~ even though perhaps potentially rather than actually. 
He then lists a number of conceptual ingredients that he rates as basic and also 
common to all knovm types of. theory. Proper interest for these elements could 
help to integrate the overall image of sociology. This integration Hould also 
be furthered by elimination of certain faults inherent in the various types of 
theory. It appears that Sorokin is open to challenge here, both in what he prop-
. oses and in v7hat he rejects. m1at is more, he begs the question as to the manner 
or manners in vrhich the elements listed '!7ill he inteBrated together. Given the 
conditioning impact of "time and placell~ it seems reasonable to assume that there 
Hill be a plurality of ways. If so, the image of one consistent discipline lo70uld 
seem less realistic than that of a congery of (if you like: sub-) disciplines. 
In fact, Sorokin has suggested this at one point in the same paper, but he does 
not appear to have folloued it through. 
This reasoning assumes critical significance fot the present period. 
NO\i7adays~ sociologists are not merely staking much on measurement (or, if Sorokin 
is right, are on the ,-ray back from having staked too much on methods and tech-
niques in general). At the same time, they are acutely uncertain about the style 
or styles of theorizing on which to concentrate their efforts, in order to achieve 
optimal results under prevailing conditions. As always ~vhen this kind of thing 
happens, this is partly because the conditions are manifestly subject to drastic 
change and nohody kno~'7s the next move. It is also because the hitherto prevail-
ing constellation of more or less accepted styles of theorizing is losing cred-
ibility. A symptomatic phenomenon is the end of the Hparsonian fascination", 
more exactly the wane of a congery of styles5~f theorizing all equally rooted 
in a particular pattern of conceptualization • No doubt several elements of 
structural-futl.ct iona11sm ~'7ill survive this crisis, and in order to persist they 
are acutely in need of a neH frame of reference. The search is on for this new 
frame of reference, this ne~v sty.le. 
Under the present circUmstances of Go·ttenlcimmerung in sociology, the 
new trend that appears to be signified by futuribles, social accounting and social 
indicators is likely to be amongst the forces pointing the direction in \'7hich the 
dicipline 'tiTill move, namely tOHards a cybernetic style of theorizing. Already 
there exist several types of theory bearing, more or less legibly, a cybernetics 
imprint. For the time being, they are likely to receive an equal fillip each 
from the advancement of these new schools of thought. Eventually, the affinity 
may prove less indiscriminate. 
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This is not the occasion to offer, by way of a second taxonomic exercise, a 
typology of sociological theories uUh a cybernetics impr~g.t. Just to demgg-
strate that thS7e is variety, the names of A. H. Gouldne:c , Bo F. Skinner ~ 
and A. Etzioni ,may be mentioned. Their more recent writings are perhaps 
more or less typical for Fhat might be considered as three variants of a cyber-
netical sociol08Y~ ideological, manipulative and in ~8rms mf grand t4eory. 
Each of them has run into more or less severe attack • The reasons why, and 
the details of the. ensul1ng debates, are less important for present purposes 
than the fact that there is heated dispute~ i'7hich is as it should. 
In this dispute, one element has to this writer v s knol'lledge been missing 
thus far. This is the input from development studies and the feedback from 
development action in the third l·70rld. On the part of those scholars ~7hose 
natural setting is North-America' or Hestern Europe, nor to have sought this in-
put is an understandable oversight, if a regrettable one. On the part of devel-
opment specialists~ it is perhaps partly a matter of isolation in their work 
spheres abroad and partly a matter of not alwa~m finding the channels to comm-
unicate l·1ith those in so-called general thf/ iry ,and this is again regrettable. 
The earlier this regrettable state of affairs is remedied, the better. 
It should be clear, from all the preceding, that current developments in devel-
opment studies are in no lvay limited 9 in their relevance, to the third l-1orld arid 
that they relate quite closely to goiges-on in the field of general sociological 
theory. Referring to the three types just sketchilly distinguished, there is 
reason to bel~Ive that the outcome of development studies could provide significant 
reinforcement to one of these types, namely the grand theory approach, and some 
warning signals for the other two types. This would be the beginning of the more 
selective support that could reach cybernetic styles of sociology from the side 
of, particularly, social indicators but to an extent also social accot!nting a.nd 
perhaps futuribles. 
t-larch 1972. C. A. O. van N ieu~7enhuij ze • 
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NOT E S 
1. In this phrasing the conditioninp; impact of specific culture 'contexts 
is disregarded for purposes of simplification. As usual,this results 
in bias ~the net effect is a presentation ·of contemporary-v!estern 
colouring. The assumption here is that this will not categorically 
invalidate the reasoning follm'led even though it leaves some crucial 
considerations. unaccounted for. 
2. The question whether this listing is exhaustive or not does not arise. 
The three items selected. are the ones that seem relevant for present 
purposes. 
3. It is equally possible to envisage an appreciation of the relationship 
that uould accord primacy to reality vis-a-vis man. FO'r present pur-
poses this alternative can be ignorecl. 
4. The complementary or countervailing perception of the relationship~ as 
"experienced!; on the part of reality:> is diffuse. This is partly be-
cause of the pervasiveness of anthropocentric conceptions, as' in the 
case of any perception of the universe in terms of retaliation.or 
countervailance (comp. H.Kelsen~ Society and natun~, London, 'Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner; 1946). Partly a88in it is due to the intervening 
differentiation between the human and the non-human components of reality. 
So far as fello~'T-nw.n is concerned, the experience will feature as recip·· 
rocal~ so that the distinction applied Hill merely repeat itself~ whether 
with an active or a passi"\ie coefficien,t (according to which of the elements 
distinguishedsub(l) and in note 3 is preponderant). The matter is pre-
sented, though somel1hat marginally~ in a mainly philosophical sense in 
E. de Vries 1 eu..; Essa~-s in neciprocity, The Hague (Uouton) 1968$ and with 
reference to various authors, in t .. H. Gouldner, "Reciprocity. and Autonomy 
in Functional Theory!;, in L. Gross~ ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory, 
Evanston~ Ill. (RoV] Peterson) 1959~ p.167--l95. So far as non-human 
reality is concerned the matter Hill oftentimes shape up as retaliation. 
In contemporary Y\Testern thou!jht it appears in fairly rudimentary and 
partial fashion. For example, it is reflected~ yet does not become fully 
explicit, in current concerns about ecology and overpopulation. 
5. As the concluding illustrations in each case show~ the distinctions 
made sub (1) and (2) are not watertight. In neither case could the one 
element be assumed to rule out the other completely. Rather than con-
stituting alternatives, let alone dilemmas, these distinctions are a matter 
of relative accent on t'tvO inr;redi€:llts of one complex. The circumstance 
that in each case the tuo ingredients are defined so as to appear as one 
anotherVs logical opposites has clearly to be taken with reservations. 
To realize this is important in order to achieve the proper appreciation 
of the distinctions proposed as criteria for differentiation.' They "1.0 
not work out as black-and~·~o]hite alternatives. Instead, they shape up 
ns typological scales or ranges, each capable of accommodating an un-
specified number of specific Variants of mix of the t~vc ingredients con-
cerned. This makes them much more pduerful devices 'for systematization 
than they may appear to be at a first glance. 
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6. As against this-anthropocentric perception, -a countervailing "reality-
centred!' perception can once more be suge;ested by Hay of a purely academic 
exercise and without relevance for present purposes. A fair illustration 
of this perception may be offered by pointing to the difference between 
man as a categorical notion on the one hand and the plurality of live 
human beings, as so many different instances of mankind~ on the other. 
7. This starts out from the observation that reality encompasses man. It 
is his context, a halo around his separate identity. It elsois the 
universe of ~vhich he is integrally part. But distinctness on the one 
hand and comprehensiveness on the other are ill matched. Thus~ reality 
is not readily amenable to man's effort at Ilcomprehensionil or IIcoming 
to terms!! (the difference between the t~·70 assumedly synonymous express-
ions is significant!), if this effort is made by means of the analytic 
procedures of humanreasou. The fossibility of a once-and...:.for-all, 
total grasp~ by man~ of reality as a \vhole is excluded in advance~ ex-
cept by means other than rational procedure (such as the rapturous 
moment of unspeakable illumination experienced by the consummate mystic)~ 
on which established Hestern scholaIship Hill not rely. This leaves 
the possibility of substitution, ~<Tith the attached disadvantage of un-
satisfactoriness in principle. Precisely because none can.be fully 
satisfactory, there Hill be more than one substitute~ each being. an 
approximat:ton., in one particular manner, to that which spould~ yet 
cannot,be achieved. 
8. It is interesting 'to note that the usual concern with parts and wholes 
is rather differently focussed. Hostly the discussion centres on 
complexity rather than identity. Yet inasmuch as the ultimate concern 
is often Hith matters like structure, they end up relating to identity 
nonetheless, albeit through some of its modalities rather than directly. 
For more philosopldcally oriented discussions comp. D. Lerner, ed., 
Parts and T-n10lcs, NeH YorI: (Free Press) 1963, esp. E. i'TEtgel ,"mlOles. 
Sums and Or.nanie Unities/! .. p.135-155i K. E. Tranoy,_ 1i~·nlC'les and ::;tructures, 
An Ar:temp'':: at Philoc:;ouhiC:;11 ArwJysi8 r- ,Copenhagen (i lunltsgaard) _ 1;J5~). 
Host of thesocio10g1.ca.L II.lSCuAs1.on occurs in the frame~·.tork of the currently 
fashionable top:lc of: systems and subsystems, on Hhich the literature is 
abundant. Olie possibly 1ess-knm-m example is O. Hamsoy, Social Groups as 
Syptem and S1..lbsystem, Oslo (Noruegian D.P.) 1962. . 
In the obverse perspective and i'7ith a relevance restricted to a parti-
cular order of magnitude, the same sociological concern appears under 
the label reference groups. With special regard to development~ the 
matter of wholes and parts assumes critical practical importance. This 
is due to the general inclination to identify the nation-state as the 
whole~ that is to say the natural unit of development, leaving the 
matter of parts, and also that of larger wholes, for incidental and 
secondary consideration. 
9. The identification procedur(~ that is involved here brings to mind the 
procedure of so-called primitive classification systems. Comp.E. D.1rkeim 
and U. i:lauss, Primiti~e Classification, Chicago (U.P.) 1963. 
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10. This is complemented by the tacit refusal to consider allY differences 
or discrepancies 'bet\'Jeen the selected part and the whole for which 
it is substituted. Under sOIile1'ihat different conditions~ where the 
matter cannot be handled tacitly ana implicitly~ one may find it 
shrugged off. Thus for example~ the Hell-knovm phrase of economic 
theory; ceteris paribus, other things Leing equal. 
11. The remark made in note 5 applies here again; with some modification. 
As defined, the two variants are one'another 1 s logical opposites~ one-act 
and partial are diametrically opposed to serial and (optimally) complete, 
respectively. However., they do not result in a variably stressed mix 
of opposites, as suggested for the two contrasts to '(",hicb. note 5 refers. 
The denl8.rcation betv7een the t':vo, which should underpin any model of 
basic opposition, tends to be blurred. M1ilst being partial, the former 
will yet be more or less inclusive, more or less expansive 'tvith respect 
to theW-hole. In being optimally complete, the latter v7ill nonetheless 
fail to achieve adequate coverage of the v1hole. 
Likell1ise. the dis tine tion between one-ac t and serial procedures is no t 
rigollrous. In the latter' case, the list resulting from itemization lvill 
be presented as one, albeit complex~ proposition representing reality 
up to a point. In the former. some virtually regressioria1 repetition 
may occur in identifying tIle part that: \vil1 have to stand for the \']hole. 
From a pars 'pro toto perception of reality as development. one easily 
procee4sto a secondary pars pro toto, such as technical or economic 
development. This marks the beginning of a different kind of serial 
procedure; in order to distinguish it one could label it vertical,as 
against horizontal for the other. nut this distinction i,s of little 
avail if it comes to the ease Hith ~'7hich one serial procedure will get 
mixed up ivith the other. 
A further additiol'l to the possible confusion ill regard to serial pro-
cedure arises from something tlr~lt Has mentioned in passing above, namely 
the ranBe of choices available to those desirous to idemtify the series 
of items - or> for that matter. the one part .- by ,-:rhich they propose to 
come to terms w'ith reality~ aspect, segment. feature~or ';'lhatever else. 
They 1:villuse only one of these and, \,?hether they account for the fact 
or 11ot. it: is inevitably one chosen from a range or ",eries of possible 
or.es. 
The practical impo-rtance of these considerations is iimnediately clear: 
in discussions 011 the development of particular sectors of society" any 
particular sector will appear strictly on and by itself if the one--act 
pars Era toto procedure is adhered to hut as one of a potential or 
actual range if the itemizing procedure is followed. Since the underlying 
choice is not always consciously 'made) confusion andV7avering are likely 
to occurs to the detrimer..t of the understanding or action that follow, 
12. Hore exactly, there is a two-step pars .EE£. ~ procedure" with one step 
(from reality to sociocultural reality) inplicit and tacit and the other 
(frO!" sociocultural rc:-::lity to ;:'<.:tio11) explicit. The action" in its turn~ 
fq brpken down in itemizing fashion, and this in various ways 9 
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using various cri ted':a employed to identify the kind of items into 
lo1hich the total phenomenon is broken d01im for itemizing definition. 
Part of tIte often mentioned lack of clarity of the Parsonian system 
resides in the Jase with 1ilhich the author, and perhaps even more so 
his follo1ilerS~ shift frolll one kind to another or combine several 
kinds. It helps little. to remedy this lack of clarity in the present-
ation, that the added exercises in itemization are implicitly claimed 
to have a built-in cumulative effect w~areby they are identical, in 
the end~ with the one-act defir..ition of sociocultural reality~ as 
action. Even if system and subsystems, pattern variables and lo1hat not 
aJ;e in the last resort synonymous with action, they do not readily 
show it. 
13. The brief statement sub(3J~ with added notes, evokes a comparative 
observation. The thologians of Islam have struggled with basically 
the same definition problem, except that their concern "{l1as religious, 
namely with divinity, instead of secular, as is the case when we are 
concerned 'tdth reality. They have come. up with a set of distinctions 
basically the same as - t~rugh apparently different from - the one 
offered above. 
They distinguish between God's essence, properties and names. The first 
is the equivalent to the ;;one-act" definition referred to above, l·Tith 
one difference. Since Islamic theology, 1io~'7ever rational it be, need 
not stipulate ·exclusive reliance on rational procedure, the knowledge, 
i.e., definition of God l s essence is not stated to be inevitably partial. 
On the other hand it is not assumed to be fully adequate, as the meta-
physical act of cognizance that it presupposeS, namely f.aith, is not the 
same as perfect kno~<]ledge. (Note, in passing, the distant similarity 
between this act of faithful definition and the naming act attributed 
to man in the biblical myth of creation, and again - quite distant and 
fully secularized _. current concern in the social sciences "tdth things 
·'heuristic. I '. Note also that these are setial). 
The Muslim notions of properties and names, in their turn, . represent 
variants of the serial, itemizing kind of definition proposed» in the 
. above, as the alternative to simple one-act definition. The difference 
between the two is interesting in its O"to1U right. as it relates directly 
to what was said towards the end of Note 11. The identification of prop-
erties or features would fi~ its contemporary equivalent in emphathic 
identification by man. In its turn, the identification by descriptive 
names, a highly stylized affair in Islam, parallels a rather more elusive 
contemporary concern~ amongst:· behaviourists and others, to go by ob--
served symptoms or indicators. (Note) again in 'passing, ho'tl1 elegantly 
strlized the Muslim presentation really is. The lOOth name of God, the 
ultimate on the list, is said to be unspeakable and unknowable as it is 
the true name. In other ~V'ords, the lOOth name~ "tlTere it knotl1U, would 
bring the entire construct full circle~ being the act of both simple and 
adequate definition, to l'lhich even faith is an approximation. Unkonwu s 
it underscores the God/man dichotomy). 
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14. The use of the term instances is typical of the serial approach. To 
start out frOla development as an instance" in this case, means that 
some enumerative exercises are tdcitly presupposed. One way to envi-
sage these is to refer back to the upper half of the chart and re-
place the word lor;', every ':ime it occurs) by the word Hand i '. (That, 
by the way, does not turn the upper half of the chart into an equiv-
alent of the 10Her half, since it does not state criteria of dis-
tinction applied tovlard enume.ration, In the case of the series be-
ginning with TECHNICAL DEVELOPi-ml~T 'j the criterion to be· added ~vould 
be something like ~;distinction by sectors;~ 'tvith this added' distinc-
tion it becomes an interesting counterpart to lthe listing'in the bottom 
half with its different use of criteria). 
15. This is the case not~vithstanding the fact that all of them are dis-
tinguished from one another by means of one or a series of logical 
oppositions. The net effect of these distinctions is not mutual ex--
clusiveness but complementarity. The distinctions applied are anal-
ytic operations and as such they will not undo the integrity of that 
to which. they refer. Thus~ an optimally satisfactory manner of deal-
ing with the underlying (instance of) reality '(viII be' seen to result 
from accumulatior: of the several aspect-wise procedures c.orresponding 
to it.ems analytically distinguished. 
16. An earlier presentl:ltion of this material ,vas given in my Development. 
A Challenge to Hhom?, The Hague (j;louton) 1969, Chapter 16. . 
17. Compo B.de Jouvenel, Liart de la conjecture. Honaco (du Rocher) 
1951f) English translation The Art of Conjecture, 1966. The study 
of futuribles is the study of futurs possibles~ possible futures, 
as a plural phenomenon. An excellent, if belated 1 review of this work 
has appeared in Tiers Honde XII!47, Paris 1971, p.677-68L The series 
Futuribles began to appear in 19G3 (Geneva, Droz). Curr~ntly, the lead-
ing periodicals are Analyse et Prevision and Chroniques deVActualite. 
18. Comp.lL Kahn and A. J. ~.Jiener~The Year 2000, A Framevlortc for Specu-· 
lation on. the :Next Thirty·-Three Years, New York (HacHillan) 1968~ with 
an unusual same· .. year translation in French, L v an 2000, Paris (Laffont). 
See also H. Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable? Ne'l)T York (Horizon) 
1962. Among the Iithink tanks ll in the USA where the study of the future 
is 'systematically conducted, the Hudson Institute and the RAND corpor-
ation are ~videly known. The general public is reached by periodicals 
such as.The Futurist (since 1967) and Futures, The Journal of Forecasting 
ana Planning (since 1969). 
19. Compo B. de Jouvel1E11, Arcadie. Essays sur Ie mieux vivre~ Paris 
(S.E.D.E.I.S) 1969. See also W. Bell and J. A. Nau. \'Imagt:!s of the 
Future; Theory and Research Strategies II , in J. C. HcKinney and E. A. 
Tiryldan, eds., Theoretical Sociology, P2rspec tives and Development~, 
New York (Appleton-Century-Croft.s) 1970; W. Bell anll J. Nau s eds., The 
Sociology of the Future? 'Jr.bcory? Cases and Annotuted Bibliography, New 
York, (Russell Sage) 1971~ F, Df'. Polak, The Image of the Future, Enlightening 
the Past,. Orienting the Present, Forecasting the Future~ 1'1C>;-1 York (Oceana) 
1961, 2 vols. ~ D. Bell, ilT~mlve Hethods of Prediction, A Preli~inary Sorting 
of Approaches in the Soc.ial SCiences;:, Daedalus XCIII!3 1964, p.845-873. 
30. 
20. B. H. Gross, The State of the Nation.Spcial SystemsAccounting~ London 
(Tavistock) 1966. Compo R. A. Bauer~ ed.~ ::;o<:ial Indicators, Boston 
(M.I.T.) 1966~ which contains an earlier version of the paper by Gross, 
together with other contributions. Summary of same paper, under some 
title, in F. E. Katz, ed., Comtemporary Sociological Theory, NewYork~ 
(Random House) 1971~ p.378-386. 
21. Compo A. S. Banks and R. 'rextor~ A Cross-Polity Survey~ Cambridge 
Nass. (H.LT.) 1963~R. L. Merritt and S. R)kkan, eds., Comparing 
Nations, The Use of ~uarititative Data in Cross-National Research, 
Nel·l. Haven (Yale) 1966; B. H. Russett;, H. R. Alker Jr., K. tv. Deutsch, 
11., W. Las svlell? vIor ld Handbook of Poli tical and Social Indica tors, 
New Haven (Yale) 1964. 
22. Good surveys relating to comparative sociology mainly but referring 
to anthropology and, to an extent, political science as well, by 
R. H. Narsh, ~'i:iaking Comparative Research Cumulative I! ~ and S. Rokkan. 
'!Cross-nationa1 Sociology: An Introductory Note", Transactions of the 
Sixth World Congress of Sociology, 1. Geneva (International Socio1.Assoc.) 
1966, p.203-221, 165-172. See also, in the same volume (p.187-201), 
S. N. Eisenstadt,:iprob1ems in the Comparative Analysis of Tota:1 Societies. 
Interesting examples from anthropology are R, Linton, ed., The Science 
of Han in the World Crisis, New York (Columbia) 1945; idem, Host of the 
\'11orld) The Peoples of Africa~ Latin America and the EaStToday, Nell7 York 
(Columbia) 1949) A. L. Kroeber. Configurations of Culture Growth, 
Berkeley (California U.P,) 1963, first ed. 1944. Special mention should 
be 1l1ade of S. P. J:furdock1s Human Relations Area Files. 
23. Some of these exercises are curiously Parsonian in inspiration and 
conceptualization. Their sophistication tends to be more readily rec-
ognizable, occasionally, than their applicability. Compo E. A. Tiryakian, 
LA Node1 of Societal Change and Its Lead Indicators", in S. Z. Klausner, 
. ed., The Study of Total Societies~ Garden City, N.Y. (Doubleday: Anchor) 
1967, p.69--97: J. P. Nettl and R. Robertson, International Systems and 
the Modernization of Societies, The Formaticn of National Goals and 
Attitudes. London (Faber & Faber) 1968. At the 1966 World Congress of 
Sociology some relevant papers were read. e.g. > J. J. Leur and A. de l.\Uguel, 
l'Intra··nation Differences mid Comparisons; r1ethodological and Substantive 
Implications':; S. Bernard, "Note sur l' etude comparative des systemes 
politiques v • 
24. On measurement, see Section V, belo"7. 
25. With special reference to developing areas. comp. S. P. Hayes Jr q 
Heas'lring the r~esults ofDevelot>lnentProjects~ Paris (Unesco) 1959; 
J. Drewnowski and \11. Scott, The Level of Living Index, Geneva 
(UNRISD~Report 4) 1966 (mimeo)~ Report on International Definition and 
Measurement of Levels of Living, Ne'tv York (UN: E/CN .3/179, E/CN5/299) 
1954 (mimeo); Internaticnal Definition and Measurement of Levels of 
Living? An Interim Guide (UN: E/CN.2/270/Rev. I, E/CN.5/353) 1961 
(mimeo),; N. ilaster and H. Subramanian, Aspects of Social and Economic 
. Grmvth, GeneV'a (UNRISD~Report 1) 1965 (mimeo) $ J. Drewnowski, Social 
and Economic Factors in Development. Geneva (UNRISD; Report 3) 1966 
31. 
(mimeo) • See also C. J. L. Ber thole t and n. 1:1. Evers ~ ilea suring Socio-
Economic Development, A Pilot Study, Ti1burg (Ins. f. Dev. Probl.) 
1965 (inimeo)?restricted; B. Evers. ;;Arm en rijkU, ~1aandschrift 
Econom:i.e, 31/2, Ti1burg, 1966, pp.8l-97; 1. Galnoor, ed.~ Social 
Information for Developing Countries, The Annals of the American 
Academy ,of Political and Social Science, 393, Philadelphia, Jan.l971. 
With special reference to developed areas, compo E. B. Sheldon and 
W. E. Hoore, eds., Indicators of Social Change. Concepts and I·leasure-
ments, New York (Russell Sage) 1968; also official U.S. 'reports 
Recent Social Trends in the United States, New York~ (HcGraw Hill) 
pp133~ Goals for Americans, Englewood Cliffs (Prentice Hall) 1960~ 
B. H. Gross ~ ed.. Social Intelligence for America is Future ,; Explor-
ations in Societal Problems, Boaton (Allyn & Bacon) 1969 (comp. the 
interesting comments in a review by R. Ross, in Contemporary Sociology 
Ill, Jan.1972~ p.46). 
26. In an open letter to the Office of Business Economics, of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (reprinted in The Brookings Bulletin, 8/3, 
Washington D.C., 1972, p.4-7), Au H. Okun' argues that it is unwise 
to attempt to "fixll G.N.P. in an attempt to "convert it into a pur-
ported measure of national welfare:'. He thinks that ['Producing a 
summary measure for social welfare is a job for~philosopher-kingl/ 
(p.4), and indeed a bigger one than can be handled by redefining a 
one-dimensional summary measure like G. N . P. (p. 7) • liThere is a big 'j ob 
to be done and national income statisticians and other economists can 
contribute to it. The experience of the national income accountant 
can be instructive to those who are working to develop social indic-
ators ( ••• )11 (ibid.). The scope of his contribution prevents Dr. Okun 
from broaching the crucial question that crops up, namely what are 
the implications of this viewpoint, thoroughly sound as it appears, for 
the role of economics~ economic action and the economists in public 
affairs and in public policy maLing. On the other hand, he implicitly 
levels, 'at the protagonists of social accounting and social indicators, 
some of the fundamental questions raised here: assuming that economics 
is not elastic, how far can we stretch it? 
27. Compo D. V. HcGranahan) c.s., Contents and Heasurement of Socio-
economic Development" An Empirical Enquiry, Geneva (UNRISD: Report 
No.70-l0)l970 (mimeo), p.10-21. A merely statistical procedure 
for this purpose is likely to attract criticism, if only because it 
begs the question about items relegated to the dust bin. A parti~' 
cularly 11.1triguing topic for those venturing upon such a critical 
exercise would be to inquire into the possible effect of, circular 
definition of items on statistical correlations. 
28. If it would? this would constitute a most intriguing phenomenon, 
countervailing, as it were~ the built-in tendency of the enumerative 
approach towards proliferation of items listed. To assess its 
significance should, then, prove a worth-while exercise. 
29. Comp.my liThe Sociology of Development: per aspera ad .astra?" ~ 
Civi1inations 1~I/1, Bruxelles, 1971, p.67-84. 
32. 
30. Compo Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, Louvain 
(Internat. S.oc.iol..Assoc.) 1962 (voL I, II), 1964 (vo1.II! ,-IV) • 
31. This point is likely to gain critical importance in the l·rake. of the 
current shake-up of the' world political map. The cold-war pattern 
of simple polarization is rapidly falling into abeyance. The three-, 
way variant of it that has been tried occasionally seems bound to 
prove abortive as it offers ample latitude for lesser pOlvers to adopt, 
at critical moments, a stance of independence towards those whose 
clients they are assumed to be. 
The demise of the polarized pattern takes the political attractive-
ness out of development aid~ wooing the uncommitted and retaining 
the allegiance of those assumedly committed are matters acquiring 
a new significance. There is to be, in this respect, a new eame with 
new rules. In response to this turn of events, some will sigh with 
relief. The political connotations of development aid have been in-
creasingly suspect. Their relief, however, may soon be followed by 
anxiety, if they happen to believe that development aid as such is a 
good and necessary thing. 
Hith the political prop gone, development co-operation becomes fully 
dependent on the three remaining motives, namely charity or solidarity, 
commercial self-interest and enlightened common sense regarding matters 
of the One '~lorld, - whether on the part of private agencies or on that 
of governments and intergovernmental agencies. Of the three, the 
former two are often considered as hardly more acceptable than power 
politics, and the third is, alas, a rare commodity in the world of 
international politics. 
Add to this a: !fairly ~videspread malaise about the efficacy of devel-
opment aid. and everything appears to conspire for a gloomy prospect 
for development co-operation. In the light of such a prospect, the 
Second Development Decade might prove a let-down of the first magnitude. 
All this because the frame of reference that had been tacitly supposed 
in designing these neH ventures has vanished overnight. 
A gloomy prospect? Hot necessarily. It could mean that the umbilical 
cord that kept many a ;'young state" tied, for a protracted period, .to 
outside force's fostering and sheltering it, is about to be severed. 
If so, this could only mean' that hencefortil, the replacement of lIinter-
national assistance· 1 by flinternational co·-operation tl is not to be 
taken as another euphemism but as a hard fact of life. This is to be 
deplored, inasmuch as it is bound to cause hardship. It is also to be 
applauded, inasmuch as it means that decolonization will no longer be 
in danger of getting stuck at the half-t·ray mark due to neocolonialism 
under one guise or another. 
As yet, nobody is too certain about the rules of this new game, called 
"international co-operation in One t>Jorld". So much is sure that for 
the new nations, development, exactly like independence, its prereq-
uisite) has already been, will henceforth have to be primarily their 
own achievement, rather than something bestowed upon they by others. 
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This could not make things easy~ but it should make them more satis-
factory. 
The net effect of all this for development studies remains to be seen. 
It is likely that there will be hardship on the financial side: the. 
funds for teaching and research will have to come from sources motivated 
by considerat~ons other than politicial expediency. But it is also 
likely that from a viewpoint of scholarship~ the foreseeable end of 
the hitherto existing preoccupation with aid will do some good. It 
will help to 'approach the problems of development in the third world,' 
with more of an open mind. It will help~ again, to see how these 
relate to quite a few problems, often differently labelled, in the 
developed parts of the world. As a consequence; it will be realized 
that the study of development and the study of society in general are 
not real~y all that far apart. This, as it happens, is one of the 
ideas' that, this paper is meant to propound. 
32. It pays to spell this out with some care, first with regard to the 
developing non-Western countries and subsequently with regard to the 
developed countries of the West. In the former, (1) the match between 
(2) the economically d6~rmined image of society held by Western-
trained development experts and (3) the actual operational pattern 
of society leaves much to be desired. As·for (1) the match as such, 
economic development planning and policies have failed to prevent 
the gap between rich and poor nations from growing wider. As for (2) 
the image~ the primacy of economic considerations in. the quest for 
development has been assumed, not proven. Slowly and inexo~ably, 
it is becoming ,a matter of doubt. As for (3) the actual operational 
pattern, the change-over of total societies from their Ol~ traditional 
pattern, however distorted by colonialism and other external and in-
ternal factors~ to a pattern amenable to ec'onomic development is not, 
as many still believe, a mere matter of foreseeable modernization, nor, 
as othersclaim~ a matter of a revolution that can be t'riggered and 
steered at will. To conceive of such a transition, by whatever formula, 
let alone, to implement it, is impossible by currently available means. 
To assume its possibility,and a fortiori to act upon such an assumption, 
is either a deception or an act of faith. Conditions in the West are 
obviously different yet strikingly parallel: a neat demonstr.ation of 
One World. conditions, As for (1) the match, we are almost daily made 
aware of'the fact that economic control over all of society is increas-
inglydifficult. As for (2) the image, the pars pro toto philosophy 
of the economic vision has gradually turned'out to be a partial and in 
effect partisan way to deal with reality, whether for purposes of under-
standing (I')r for purposes of action. As for (3) the actual operations 
pattern, it suffices to recall the mounting concern about the detrimental 
fall-out of procedures that, in maximizing one aspect of reality, atrophy 
all the rest. All these realizations add up to grave concerns, amongst 
economists and non·economists alIke. Compo as one example out of several, 
A. H. WJ;liteford, ed., A Reappraisal of Economic Development, Per-
spectivesfor Cooperative Research, Chicago (Alding) 1967. 
34. 
33. Against this background, phrases like ceteris paribus assume an ominous 
significance. 
34. Compo J. Robinson, Economic Philosophy, London (Watts) 1962. 
35. A neat case of positively functional meaninglessness 1 this, as it keeps 
all options open. Under the circumstances, latitude to move' is perhaps 
more needed than anything else. 
36. At this time, reflection has not yet caught up with progress. As yet, 
not much of a philosophy is distingui"shable underneath the iteIlizing 
approach. It will come after the facts. There are in particular tlolO 
issues that await proper consideration. One is the selection of items. 
Currently, the desired broadening of the scope is achieved simply by 
means of occasional addition of items to a roster. Even so, any item 
to be included must somehotiT qualify. The matter of criteria for qual-
ification remains 9 by and large, to be systematically considered, even 
though it clearly has a fundamental significance. For the time being 
people are preoccupied methodologically and will require little beyond 
measurability (see Note 24) and perhaps statistical correlation (see 
Note 26). 
The second moot point is how any item that might be eligible for in-
clusion is identified in the first place. As of now, this is left 
to the liberum arbitrium of those interested, but the matter is too 
important to be left to the personal discretio-
of the experts. Indeed it is likely to prove a risky affair 
since ethnocentrism is bound to come in as a factor in any international 
settings; and so is its parallel, prejudices of various kinds, in. 
national ones. 
Some time ago this writer has made an attempt to find some methodo-
logical safeguards against these dangers, by raising the question how 
to identify development goals. (,'On the Identification of Development 
Goals f ", Development and Change 1/1, The Hague, 1969,p.3-20). 
Goals, obviously, is not the same as indicators or as either of the 
other two procedures reviewed. Still, goal identificatio:n is yet 
another enumerative-totalistic manner of tackling the question what de-
velopment really is. Thus it. might be added as a fourth exercise to 
the three that we have reviewed. It may have two advantages over'them~ 
namely (1) the recognition that development is specific to the given 
development situation and (2) the refusal to consider the nation-state 
as the one natural unit of development. 
37. There is in fact a double trend. One component is away from the pars 
~ toto tOl-lards the enumerative perception 0 definition, in other words 
from the upper to the lower half of the chart. The other is from any 
given part to that which is seen to be its immediately ,antecedent Whole, 
in other words from a position in one particular column in the upper 
half of the chart to a pOSition in the column to the left of it. An 
example is the shift from economic development as a concern to development 
at large as an allegedly more appropriate concern. The latter trend is 
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by no means limited to those interested in development. It is equally. 
visible in som,e of the so-called protest movements in the developed 
countries. Consider those who attack the alleged repression exerted by 
one sector of society (say, the military-industrial establishment) over 
society as a whole. This construct represents, first, the realization 
that for all practical purpo,ses the part is the whole, secondly, the 
realization that this quasi··identity is reflected in an operational 
pattern (usually called control); aud thirdly, the rejection of both 
(introducing the descriptive term repression for the purpose). 
38. In some circles, all this is viewed with eagerness? as a dream about 
to' come true., A countervailing and not less valid appreciation could 
result from the observation that ~otalistic and totalitarian are closely 
related, without a clear line of demarcation to keep them apart. 
39. It is interesting to note how transitions like these are in the air. 
People will make them 'tiTithout sho~1iug any signs, of awareness as to their 
fundamental nature and their implications. The following two sentences, 
taken fromV. A.Thompson's paper "Administrative Objectives for Devel-
opment Administration1i (in G. D. Ness, ed., The Sociology of Development, 
A Reader,New York, Harper Row, 1970, p.5l8), qffer a good illustration. 
"In a situation of rapid change, control is much less relevant. The 
ideal must 'be adaptation, and this involves creativity and looseness of 
definition and structure';. The shift is clear, but it is not stated in 
so many words that this is a transition from one basic perception of 
reality to another. 
40. It was presented, in a different context, in Civilisations XIX/3, 
Bruxelles 1969, p.359. 
41. It may be hard, occasionally, to draw the line, but development and 
revolution are not the same. Slogans like White Revolution (used in 
Iran) are clever but they risk being counterproductive in ,the end, as 
they will satisfy neither revolutionaries nor antirevclutionaries. 
White against red is another matter, of course; but that distinction is 
not saying'all. 
42. An interesting example of the new style in development work,is 
E. H.. Kulp, Rural Development PlaMing, Systems Analysis and Working 
Hethod, Hew York, (Praeger) 1970. 
43. Compo G. Gusdorf ~ Introduction aux science.s humaines, Paris (Belles Lettres) 
1960. 
44. For SOCiology, compo P. A. Sorokin, IiDiversity and Unity in Sociology", 
and A. Touraine, IIUnite et diversite de la sociologie'~, ,Transactions of 
the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Geneva (Internat .Sociol. Assoc.) 
I, 1966,p.49-64 and II, 1967, p.119-l34. 
45. An interesting exercise, roughly along these lines, is offered in a paper 
entitled '"Sociology and the Other Social Sciences ll , published as the 
first chapter of N. J. Smelser, Essays. in Sociological Explanation, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (Prentice-Hall) 1968, p.3-44. Six diSCiplines, 
. 46. 
36. 
including psychol?gy and history, are systematically reviewed in an 
attempt to demonstrate their peculiarities in regard to such of their 
ereInents~or in~gredients as ~tIie al.lthor considers crucial. The resulting 
comparison is interesting notwithstanding obvious streamlining and over-
simplification. Even so, the prospect of possibilities, hopefully 
draliTU by the author in his conclusion, remains to be vindicated by 
actual developments. 
The problem is not neH. A. Comte (Cours de philosophie positive, I, 
Paris 1907, p~16) has expressed concern about overspecialization and 
suggested the need for a further specialization for remedial purposes, 
namely in the matter of relationships between disciplines. N. Elias 
(Was ist Soziologie?, Hunchen, Juventa, 1970, end of Ch.l) quotes Comte 
because he is facing the same issue; but he sidesteps it w'ith the demand, 
justifyable in itself, that sociology be seen as a Urelatively autonomous 
d.iscipline". 
Compo N. Wiener, 
and the Machine, 
Cybernetics, Or Control and Communication in the Animal 
New York (Wiley) 1948. 
47. The implication of this statement is that thiS is a problem for 't-lhich 
no ready solution io in sight at the present time. To turn away from 
this difficulty is one of the less advisable ways of living with it. 
Therefore the present writer is unable to agree with those who give a 
presentation of the problem in which the sharp edges are somehow 
blurred. One example out of many is the following phrase, lifted out of 
its broader context~"Nor is science to be identified with precise 
measurement or mathematical calculation. It is better to be exact than 
inexact, and much of modern science would be impossible without quan-
t1.tative observations and -uithout the mathematical tools needed to con-
vert its reports into more general statements; but we may measure,or 
be mathematical lvithout being scientific at all, just as we may be 
scientific in an elementary lvay without these aids". (B. F. Skinner, 
Science and Human Behavior, New York, Free Press~ 1965, p.12). 
48. For the sake of completeness some remarks are in order about values, 
since these were just mentioned as the one horn of the dilemma of 
which measurement is the other. The values problem, as suggested, is 
another of the 'inevitable corollaries of the prevailing conception, 
vague as it is, of the nature of the social sciences. As such it is 
bound to feature as a recurrent issue, too important to neglect at any 
time yet too difficult to allow for real progress in the dealings tha.t 
scholars have lvith it as a subject by itself. 
Still, in most of its current appearance the matter seems unnecessarily 
bedeviled by confusion about at least one basic issue that could, in 
principle, be sorted out. This is the matter of relativity of values, 
as conditioned by the specificity of culture contexts. Especially in 
sociology, the claims to generality normally upheld in theory-building 
risk being at odds with the very specific, time-and-place .,onditioned 
nature of that to which it refers in the first place. There is no 
valid reason why this should be so. The actual reaso~, as often as 
n.ot, is that the theorists concerned are far from successful in 
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achieving a universal perception~ as they should if their claim to 
generality tt7ere to stand. 
The main advantage of recognizing the cultural specificity of values 
should be that values would become slightly less difficult to identify. 
This would be the case pa'J:'ticularly if those advocating thehistorical--
philo;Logicalapproach and those advocating the social sciences approach 
could reach across the barriers that separate them; but that is yet 
another chapter. 
49. A usef~l summary, with references to arguments to the contrary as brought 
by the protagonists of quantifi:ation in the social sciences, can be found 
in F, R. A1len~ Socio-cultural Dynamics, An Introduction to Social Change, 
i'Jet-7 York (Hacmillan) 1971, eh.9, esp .228 f, The nature of the arguments 
pro quantification is such that in the last resort one faces the choice 
between accepting them? whether on authority or in faith, or keeping 
onels doubts. This being so, the second attitude seems the wiser one~ 
since it does by no means reject quantification as far as it will saf,ely 
go. 
Compo espec~ally D. Lerner, ed., Quantity and Quality, New York 
(Free Press) 1961, in which quantification is presented ,in a positive 
vein by the editor (p.l3) and more sceptically by J. G. Kemeny (p.35f) 
in a paper entitled IrHathematics without Numbers l '. 
50. One of the main attractions of systems theory is that in presenting 
reality as a system of systems it suggests a fundamental, regularity, that 
is repetition and re-peatability, which might go a long 'way to remedy the 
problem of the too short statistical runs, Unfortunately the suggestion 
is extremely'hard to substantiate. In coming dmm to earth from the 
lofty generality of general theory, the systems theorist is likely to 
find himself comple tely absorbed in the uniqueness of t,he singular sys tem 
he happens, to be dealing 't'1ith, and gone are the infinite statistical 
runs. 
51. The zympioms of the decline of l:economocr acyl: in public affairs are 
matched by symptoms ,·7ithin the realm of economics proper. Amongst these, 
the grovri.ng concern about growth is particularly notable 0 
The current debate on growth tends to concentrate on the realization 
that it cannot go on~ both because of the increasing significance of 
adverse implications and, more fundamentally, because in, the last re-
sort unlimited growth will not fit in a limited human universe. For the 
time being it does not yet pay much attention to the question why growth, 
as one of the main determinants of the Western mind, could have become 
and remained so predominant, given the fact that in the end it turns out 
to be such an ominous proposition. 
A conceivable ~vay of dealing with this question \-1ill be suggested here, 
on a purely tentative basis. To do so is appropriate in the present 
connection because it ties in \-lith the argument of this paper. It 
refers back to the distinction made in the preceding, between the 
traditional vision of a theoretical model more or less mechanically 
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applied to reality in order to control and indeed to mould it, and an 
emergent vision in more or less cybernetic terms. 
Consider the earHer con'struct at closer T.anBe. It has a logical 
peculiarity. On the one hand, the assumption of effective amenability 
of reality to human manipulation implies a virtual identity between 
model and reality,: but on the r;·ther hand the assumption that the 
theoretical model has to be applied in order to mould reality into 
proper shape implies a discrepancy betl-Teen the two" Virtual identity 
equals non-identity" This conceptual impasse could prove a·stumbling 
block unless its consequences can somehow' be evaded. This is impossible 
conceptually, but by shifting ground from a conceptual to an operational 
frame of reference it may yet be done. 
Note, in parenthesis, what this means; people will find that they have 
to live with an unresolved logical problem, and by the manner in which 
they do this they wi11 turn it into a great source of creative action. 
(The phenomenon is recurrent in Western llistory and perhaps elsewhere 
too. It might provide a clue to a little recognized principle of 
sociocultural action and/or change. Both the idea of social action 
as the application of cognitive models and that of innovation as a 
combination of existing elements fai.l to take effective cognizance' 
of it). The point here is that, translated into operational terms, the 
contrast inevitably appears as a field of tension; but thi.s does not 
pose insoluble problems. Its significance can be seen as" a challenge 
to, indeed the reason for the existence ofs the planner, policy maker 
etc. 
This interpretati.on eliminates most of the problem. What remains to 
be resolved is the circumstance that it entails the time dimension, 
more exactly time flovl, as a crucial consideration.: part of the original 
contrast will shape up as time elapsing. The sociologist H. F. Ogburn, 
in struggling with social change, has attempted to come to grips with 
the matter by introducing the concept of cultural lag; in so doing he has 
tacitly adopted a retrospective stance. (Comp. Social Change, With 
Respect to Culture and Original Nature, New York, Dell, 1966, p.44). 
In the same vein it might be argued that economists have addressed them-
selves to the same discrepancy, whilst adopting a prospective stance, 
and have labelled it growth. From the rush of publications on the 
subject, a few may be quoted by v]ay of· illustration: J. Forrester, World 
Dynamics, Cambridge, Hass., (Wright-Allen) 1971~ D. II. Headows et al., 
The Limits to Growth, A Report for the Club-of Rome IS Project on the 
Predicament of Hankind, New York (Universe) 1972. The disequilihrating 
impact of this em~rgent concern is illustrated, in its turu, by the 
reIIlarkable fact that reputable economists will show all the signs of 
conversion to a standpOint that hitherto they were loth to recognize as 
valid. An impressive example is J. Pen, :;De onbekende consequenties van 
het model van Forrester - I:leadows voor de economische politiek\;, 
(The unknown consequences of the Forrester·-meadov7s model for' economic 
policy). Economisch Statistische Berichten 16.2.1972, p.159-l62. 
Even so, this new concern provides only part of the proposed answer. 
It shifts the problem. The next qtiestion is w:hy, out of all concepts 
imaginable, people should have picked growth. This may have to be seen 
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as a historical coincidence. The concept of scarcity, already belab-
oured .. by the Calvinist ethic and the like .- to the point where it 
shaped up as the maximization of scarce resources (:fuly supplemented 
by the assiduous effort to make ever: more resources available)~ could 
lend .itself quite conveniently to a yet further step of specification, 
in consequence of which it could appear as desired grol'1th. It should 
not be too difficult for the historian of economic thought to list an 
array of circumstances that could have proved conducive to just this 
kind of development. 
What is remarkable. about .the current tendency is that it appears to 
bring the cilange in meanings of·scarcity full circle; no longer a 
spur for maximization, but once again a limitation. In retrospect~ 
the circle remains interesting. The original senSe of scarcity as 
limitation, once accepted as a distinct sociocultural category and 
subsequently as a determinant. of .Western thinking and acting, has 
evoked the countervailing value which, for reasons shown, had to shape 
up as an effort rather than as a mere concept. The countervailance has 
never obliterated the original value~ witness the fact that,as Keynesian 
theory has it, inflation is a necessary corollary of grol-lth. Still by 
proving increasingly successful it has reached thepo.int where in its 
turn it has begun to elicit the need for a countervailing effect. Part 
of this appea:rs in the various scares of the present day: ecology, 
population,and so forth, Another part appears in precisely that 
which is now under review: the return to the original meaning of scarcity. 
This return could make no sense unless neu ways are found to employ 
scarcity as an effectively operational principle, vlhether directly or 
through a new procedure or countervailance. At this time it appears as 
if it may be put to use directly, in a framet-70rk of cybernetic thought 
and action. In other words, in this respect again the transition dis-
cussedabov.e is crucially import:mt. The reference to cybernetics, at 
thispoint~ needs further qualification. Business, that is growth econ-
omics at the micro level of implementation, has for.a long time employed 
the feed.,.back loop of .thf;!cybernetics model to great advant.age in terms 
of growth: selling what sells and giving it an added boost by skilful 
promotion. This is why television is as outrageously bad as it is (even 
ill most places ·where it is not supposed to be commercial, becaus.e the 
effort there to capture the audience will foil.lowthe commercial, com-
petitivepattern), and why the worse trash a publisher .or record company 
will put out? the more successful he will be. As against the cynical 
moneygrabbing operator ~vho adopts this kind of practice as the ~vay of the 
market place, B. F. Skinneris Walden Two introduces the benevolent 
operator:, the irilperceptible big brother, who reinforces that "lhich is 
good in people and in doing achieves a blissful self-sustained utopia 
just off the high~vay. In both variants, the cybernetic model is fals-· 
ified by means of the tacit and su~reptitious super·-imposition of the 
earlier model, of the pre-existent plan or norm that is imposed and 
effectuated. The falsification is easy because the c.ircular model of 
cybernetics does inevitably imply that one point on the circle, namely 
the subject-actoris location, has special significance. To recognize this 
is one thing; to spell out a cybernetics model that Hould not be liable 
to this kind of dangerous distortion is quite another. 
40. 
53. Sorokin goes so far as to distinguish a cybernetic sociolOgy. This 
seems acceptable only if it is assumed that the cybernetic perception 
of reality corresponds to a range of sociological styles, and amongst 
these most clearly to that which he describes as cybernetic sociology. 
54. The reference is to the predominance of timeless/placeless qualitative 
abstraction as distinct from operational abstraction.' Compo my Social 
Scientists in Pursuit of Social Change, The Hague (Houton) 1966. 
55. Comp. 
1970. 
comp, 
The Coming Crisis of ivestern Sociology> new' York (Basic Books) 
Another author to be mentioned in this connection is H. Marcuse; 
especially Eros and Civilization, Boston (Beacon) 1955. 
56. Cnmn. Science and Human Beavior, New York (Free Press) 1953; Beyo~d 
Freedom and Dignity, New York (Knopf) 1971. 
57. Compo The Active Society, A Theory of Societal and Po1iticai Processes, 
New York (Free Press), 1968. 
58. Camp. J" 0 'Ueill j lIThe Ne.v Sociology and the Advent" of Alvin' W. Gouldner", 
The' Canadial1 Review of Sociolof,y and AntI'opology/La Revue Canadienne de 
Sociologie et \~I Anthropologie, 9/2, 1972, p.167-l75; Review of Etzioni, 
o.c., by R. M. Cook in AmerIcan Journal of Sociology, 75/4, Jan..1970, 
p.564 f, 76/1, July 1970, p,156 ff.; G. Marwell and R. Boguslaw, 
nSkinner,. Pro and Coni" Contemporary Sociology I/l, Jan.1972, p.19-2" 
especially Boguslawis remarks on p~25. 
59. In this respect the emergence of spe.cial periodicals for Bdevelopruentology" 
is not 'an unmixed ble.ssing. Among these periodicals are the following: 
Civilicr'ltion, Cultures et D~veloprement, Development and Change, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, International Development Revie'tv, Journal 
of Developing Areas, Tiers Me a!e . 
60. As a fourth type,' at least one case of a special theory may b,e quoted, 
even though it is a ,leak case. This is conflict theory revised in 
such a "Tayas to envisage conflict as functional, whether positively 
or negatively, on and by itself and not merely through its (creative) 
outcome" (Camp. L, Coser, The Function of Social Conflict, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul~ 1956). From conflict thus envisaged to cyber-
ne ticD is a reI a ti vely sr,lall step. This step does no t seem: to have 
been made yet, perhaps because the newer appreciation'ofccmflict came 
too early in the day. 
,61. Not without corrective elements. 
